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EXHAUSTION OF TRIBAL REMEDIES:
EXTOLLING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY WHILE
EXPANDING FEDERAL JURISDICTION
LAURIE REYNOLDS*
In recent years, the importance of Indian tribal courts as an
independent legal forum has increased significantly. As the cases
brought in tribal courts have grown in both number and
complexity, however, new questions regarding the proper
jurisdictional boundaries among tribal, state, and federal courts
have reached the forefront in Native American law. In National
Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, the
United States Supreme Court first began to grapple with this issue
In that case, the Court announced what has come to be known as
the "tribal exhaustion rule," under which federal courts must
decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters that fall within tribal
jurisdiction until the appropriate tribal remedies have been
exhausted.
In this article, Professor Laurie Reynolds analyzes the
development of the tribal exhaustion rule and concludes that the
jurisdictional dividing line has been improperly drawn. In her
view, the rule in its present form prevents federal courts from
hearing some matters involving important federal questions; yet by
permitting extensive federal court review of final tribal rulings the
rule fails to accord proper deference to tribal determinations.
After detailing the shortcomings of the tribal exhaustion doctrine,
Professor Reynolds proposes redrawing the boundary lines
between federal and tribal jurisdiction. By narrowly interpreting
federal question jurisdiction to exclude those cases that can be
heard in tribal courts while simultaneously making tribal rulings
reviewable in the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari, Professor
Reynolds argues that tribal sovereignty can be more effectively
protected and further development of tribal judicial systems
encouraged without sacrificing litigants' abilities to receive a full
and fair hearing of their grievances.
* Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. The author would like to thank
Byron Keeling and John Lopatka for their insightful criticisms of earlier drafts of this
Article and to recognize the valuable research assistance of Ilene Diamond, Anthony
Troyke, and Jason Turner.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As Native American tribal courts have expanded their jurisdic-
tional reach and enhanced their judicial procedures,' disputes over
the proper scope of tribal court jurisdiction have increased. With its
broad 1985 ruling in National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians,2 the Supreme Court began its effort to delineate the
proper scope of tribal court jurisdiction. In its holding, the National
Farmers Court established that federal courts must decline to exercise
their federal question jurisdiction 3 in many Indian law cases4 until
1. With the creation of the Courts of Indian Offenses in the late 1800s, the United
States government first imposed non-traditional forms of dispute resolution upon Indian
tribes. See WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES: EXPERIMENTS IN ACCUL-
TURATION AND CONTROL 104 (1966). These courts, staffed by Indian judges appointed
by the reservation agent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, administered a code established
by the Secretary of the Interior. Id. at 109. They were frequently mere instrumentalities
of the reservation agent, serving only to consolidate his absolute power over the
reservation. Id. at 173. At the same time, however, the courts did incorporate some
elements of the traditional tribal councils. Id. at 174. With the passage of the Allotment
Act of 1887 and the influx of non-Indian settlers into many reservations, the reservation
borders often disappeared, triggering a decline in importance of Indian courts. Id. at 141.
Subsequently, with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, Congress created
a new type of tribal tribunal, referred to generally as "tribal courts." The statute
authorized these new entities to draft their own constitutions and tribal codes, subject to
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. Id. at 150-51. Both these courts and Courts
of Indian Offenses (also referred to as C.F.R. courts) exist today as tribal judicial bodies.
The federal cases involving questions of tribal court jurisdiction do not distinguish between
the two types of courts.
Approximately 150 tribal courts and 20 Code of Indian Offenses courts currently exist
in the United States. The Duro Decision: Criminal Misdemeanor Jurisdiction in Indian
Country: Hearing on H.R. 972 Before the House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1991) [hereinafter Duro Hearing] (statement of Ronal D. Eden,
Director, Office of Tribal Services); Tribal Court Systems and the Indian Civil Rights Act:
Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1988)
(statement of Donald D. Dupuis, President, National American Indian Court Judges
Association).
With the recent passage of the Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103-76, 107 Stat.
2004 (1993) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (Supp. 1994)), which authorizes annual
appropriations of more than $50,000,000 over a seven-year period, tribal court systems will
undoubtedly increase their workload and expand their jurisdictional scope at a
substantially more rapid pace. Central to the passage of this legislation was Congressional
recognition that "the lack of available funds [for tribal courts] places severe constraints on
the development of tribal justice systems." H.R. Rep. No. 205, 103d. Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2425, 2430.
2. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
3. Pursuant to federal statute, the federal district courts have "original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
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the appropriate tribal remedies have been exhausted.5 In the subse-
quent case of Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,6 the Court
expanded the exhaustion rule to apply to cases brought pursuant to
federal diversity jurisdiction 7 The decision provoked a lone dissent
by Justice Stevens, who characterized the majority opinion as
embodying the "anomalous suggestion that the sovereignty of an
Indian tribe is in some respects greater than that of [a state]."8
Predictably, academic commentators have had mixed reactions to
the rule. In recent years, writers have described the tribal exhaustion
rule as a welcome opportunity for the development of tribal court
independence,9 as an unwarranted intrusion into tribal sovereignty,"
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
4. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not clearly delineate the class of cases to
which the tribal exhaustion doctrine applies. Even proponents of the tribal exhaustion
doctrine bemoan its lack of clarity. See, e.g., Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of
Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 329, 335 (1989)
[hereinafter Pommersheim, Crucible of Sovereignty]. The Court's lack of precision has led
to great inconsistency among the lower federal courts. Some courts seem to apply the
doctrine to any case involving contact with a Native American, a tribal entity, or a
reservation. See, e.g., Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1992)
(stating that exhaustion is required in spite of multiple and substantial off-reservation
contacts). In contrast, other courts seem to limit the doctrine to "purely internal" tribal
affairs. See, e.g., United States ex reL Kishell v. Turtle Mountain Hous. Auth., 816 F.2d
1273, 1276-77 (8th Cir. 1987) (deciding to order tribal exhaustion because the trespass suit
at issue was a "purely internal tribal controversy"). See also infra notes 88-108 and
accompanying text (contrasting the various approaches taken by the lower courts).
5. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856-57.
6. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
7. Id. at 16-19 ("[T]he exhaustion rule announced in National Farmers Union applies
here as well.").
8. Id. at 22 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
9. Timothy W. Joranko, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies in the Lower Courts After
National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual: Toward a Consistent Treatment of Tribal
Courts by the Federal Judicial System, 78 MINN. L. REv. 259, 286-93 (1993) (arguing for
exhaustion "in nearly all cases in which it is requested," on grounds of "clarity and
economy" as well as faithfulness to the goals of Iowa Mutual and National Farmers);
Pommersheim, Crucible of Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 329 (approving of the holdings in
National Farmers and Iowa Mutual for "not just ... their general recognition of the
importance of tribal courts, but more decisively [for] their explicit rules which curb the
most prevalent attempts to undermine and circumvent tribal court jurisdiction"); see also
Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court
Jurisdiction, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 411, 412 (referring to the holdings as "seminal"); Michael
Taylor, Modern Practice in the Indian Courts, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 231,273 (1987)
(concluding that National Farmers will promote "advances in the responsibilities and
competence" of tribal courts).
10. Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonialized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 150 (1993) (describing the
exhaustion doctrine as a reflection of "the ultimate colonialist distrust of leaving the final
resolution of [causes of action arising on reservations] to tribal governance"); Robert N.
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and as a pragmatic accommodation between "Anglo-American
procedural and substantive values" and "Indian traditions of dispute
resolution."'" In fact, the tribal exhaustion rule is all of these things.
Acclaimed by the Supreme Court as the effectuation of Congress's
commitment to a strengthened and more vigorous tribal
sovereignty," the doctrine instructs the lower federal courts to allow
preliminary tribal court resolution of cases that would otherwise be
within their subject matter jurisdiction. At the same time, however,
the Court's rule creates serious doubts about the finality of those
tribal court decisions. While the Court seemingly enhanced the reach
of tribal court jurisdiction by refusing to allow the exercise of federal
court jurisdiction in the first instance, it simultaneously expanded the
scope of subsequent federal review for litigants disappointed with the
tribal court result. 3 With its extremely broad definition of federal
question jurisdiction in disputes involving Indians and Indian tribes,
the National Farmers decision may ultimately bring virtually every
tribal court case within the reach of the federal courts.
Although the scope of tribal court jurisdiction has only recently
become an important issue of federal law, the tribal exhaustion
doctrine was by no means written on a clean slate. Rather, it reflects
the convergence of several well-established and long-standing Indian
law principles. In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
established the still undisturbed rule that, because the tribes exercise
inherent sovereignty and are not instrumentalities of the federal
government, the constitutional limitations on the exercise of federal
powers are inapplicable to tribal actions. 4 The scope of inherent
tribal sovereignty, however, has always been limited by two powerful
Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 841, 879-80 (1990)
[hereinafter Clinton, Legacy of Conquest].
11. Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137,1234 (1990). Milner Ball also seems
to fall in this "somewhere-in-the-middle" camp. He criticized National Farmers for its
extension of federal plenary power and affirmation of tribal divestiture over criminal
actions against nonmembers, yet recognized that it "at least preserves the civil jurisdic-
tional integrity of tribal courts." Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987
AM. B. FOuND. REs. J. 3, 20 (1987); see also infra note 87.
12. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9,15 (1987); National Farmers Union Ins.
Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985).
13. Near the end of its opinion in National Farmers, the Court noted that "the orderly
administration of justice in the federal court will be served by allowing a full record to be
developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits or any question concerning
appropriate relief is addressed." National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856.
14. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
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counterpoints: the doctrines of implicit divestiture and plenary
federal power.
The theory of implicit divestiture works to invalidate the exercise
of any tribal power found by the Court to be inconsistent with the
tribe's dependent status." As developed in a series of cases, the
fundamental criterion in this analysis is whether the tribal power
sought to be asserted would, in the Court's view, "be inconsistent with
the overriding interests of the National Government."' 6 Although
the Court has used the implicit divestiture analysis relatively
infrequently, its impact on tribal sovereignty has been profound.
Under its aegis, the Court has denied tribal power to transfer
property,17 to enter into commercial or other relations with foreign
governments," to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 9
and over nonmember Indians," to regulate the hunting and fishing
activities of non-Indians who own land within the borders of a
reservation,2' and to exercise zoning power over the property of
nonmembers living within the borders of a reservation.' Because
15. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208-10 (1978).
16. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
153-54 (1980).
17. See Johnson & Graham's Lesee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,587-88 (1823)
("[D]iscovery gave [the United States Government] an exclusive right to extinguish the
Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest.").
18. In United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978), the Court noted: "[T]he
dependent status of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily
inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine their external relations." For
an earlier expression of that sentiment, see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559
(1832) (describing the "irresistible [federal] power, which excluded [tribes] from
intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer").
19. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
20. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990). Congress overruled the effects of
that opinion by amending federal law to provide specifically that tribal courts have mis-
demeanor jurisdiction over the on-reservation criminal activities of nonmember Indians.
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, § 8077, Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1856
(1990) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)-(4) (Supp. V 1993)).
21. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1981).
22. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989). The Brendale Court held that the Tribe did not have the power to
impose stricter zoning regulations within the "open areas" of the reservation than those
promulgated by the county. Id. at 428-30 (opinion of White, J.). Approximately half the
open area was owned in fee, and access was not restricted to the general public. Id. at
415-16 (opinion of White, J.). The Court did, however, uphold the tribe's limited right to
regulate land use within the reservation's "closed area." Id. at 444-45 (opinion of Stevens,
J.). This decision hinged upon the fact that only a small percentage of this area was
owned in fee and that the tribe had continuously maintained its power to exclude
nonmembers from entering this area. Id. (opinion of Stevens, J.).
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the doctrine of implicit divestiture works to divest tribal sovereignty
primarily in areas "involving the relations between an Indian tribe
and nonmembers of the tribe,"'  its potential relevance for the
delineation of tribal court powers is substantial.
Similarly, the doctrine of federal plenary power 4 in Native
American affairs was instrumental in establishing Congress's
supremacy over the tribes' ability to exercise their retained inherent
sovereign powers. As the Supreme Court stated succinctly in United
States v. Wheelet: "[Tribal sovereignty] exists only at the sufferance
of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance."26 In fact, the
For a particularly insightful criticism of Brendale, see Joseph William Singer,
Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1991). The author demonstrates that the
Supreme Court often treats tribes as sovereigns when the tribes would benefit from being
treated as property owners (when, for example, Congress abrogates treaties). Id. at 55-56.
Conversely, the Court tends to treat tribes as voluntary associations when they would
benefit from being treated as sovereigns (most notably when the tribes try to exercise
governmental power over non-Indians). Id.
23. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
24. Although this Article assumes the validity, or at least the continued existence, of
the doctrine of plenary federal power, Professors Judith Resnik and Robert Williams have
condemned the doctrine as an example of sheer lawless force exerted on a conquered
people. They show how it stands alone as a federal power unchecked by constitutional
limits and arising from an extra-Constitutional source. See Judith Resnik, Dependent
Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 671, 692-96
(1989); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing andAmericanizing White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219,
258-67. Professor Williams's article sparked a series of exchanges with Professor Robert
Laurence. Professor Laurence, while agreeing with many of Williams's descriptions of the
federal government's relationship with Indian tribes, nevertheless provided a partial
defense of the plenary power doctrine. See generally Robert Laurence, Learning to Live
with the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations: An Essay in Reaction to
Professor Williams's Algebra, 30 ARIZ. L. REv. 413 (1988) [hereinafter Laurence, Learning
to Live with Plenary Power] (suggesting that recognizing both plenary power and tribal
sovereignty is better than no tribal sovereignty); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to
Live with Eurocentric Myopia, 30 ARIZ. L. REv. 439 (1988) [hereinafter Williams,
Learning Not to Live With Eurocentric Myopia] (countering that the discovery doctrine
and its related plenary power doctrine permanently deny Indians true self-determination);
Robert Laurence, On Eurocentric Myopia, The Designated Hitter Rule and "The Actual
State of Things," 30 ARIZ. L. REv. 459 (1988) (responding to the criticisms by Professor
Williams on a point-by-point basis).
25. 435 U.S. 313 (1978)
26. Id. at 323. Scholars have proposed a number of theories on which the Court might
protect tribal sovereignty from congressional interference, including the Due Process
Clause, see Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195,261-67 (1984); the Supremacy Clause, see Richard B.
Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 365, 383-84 (1989),
and principles of international law, see id. at 370. Professor Collins has also asserted that
"the most important structural protection [of tribal sovereignty] is the federal system itself
and the allocation of paramount power to the federal government rather than the states."
[Vol. 731094
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Court has never held federal legislation in the area of Native
American affairs to be beyond the scope of Congress's plenary
power.2 7
Of more recent vintage, yet equally important to the develop-
ment of the tribal exhaustion rule, is the Supreme Court's opinion in
Williams v. Lee,' which held that Arizona's state courts lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to hear a suit brought by the non-Indian
proprietor of a store on the Navajo Reservation against a Navajo to
recover money allegedly owed.29 Crucial to the Court's holding was
its observation that "to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here
would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation
affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
themselves."30  Although its opinion did not examine whether a
Id. at 382.
27. Newton, supra note 26, at 195; Ball, supra note 11, at 12; Duro, Hearing, supra
note 1, at 126 (Statement of Professor Newton, reaffirming the truth of this assertion as
of 1991). In a recent article, Professor David Williams challenged the validity of the
plenary power doctrine as it is currently applied, noting that it does not rest on a common
understanding of the legitimacy of that power. That is, even though courts may accept the
existence of plenary federal power, they should nevertheless find a justification for it that
will in turn help shape a model of statutory interpretation in federal Indian law. David
Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and Community
in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REv. 403, 408-416 (1994).
28. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
29. Id. at 223.
30. Id. Williams v. Lee also contained language, however, indicating that the decision
partially hinged upon implicit federal preemption of state jurisdiction: "No Federal Act
has given state courts jurisdiction over such controversies." Id. at 222. At the time of the
case, applicable federal law, commonly known as Public Law 280, allowed the states to
assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians, but required an explicit
assumption of jurisdiction on the part of the state. Id. Arizona's constitution expressly
disclaimed jurisdiction over such matters. Id. at 223 n.10.
In McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1973), the Court
expressly approved of the modern trend to ignore "platonic notions of Indian sovereignty
and to look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state
power." Id. at 172. For the McClanahan Court, tribal sovereignty was more properly
relegated to a "backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must
be read." Id.
Similarly, in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), the Court
appeared to ignore completely the notion that state law could be rendered inapplicable to
Indian reservations by the force of inherent tribal sovereignty. Id. at 148. Rather, the
Court preferred to rely solely on the doctrine of federal preemption to determine the
scope of permissible state involvement in tribal and reservation affairs. See id. at 148-51.
The Court did, however, approve of the McClanahan Court's suggestion that the doctrine
of tribal sovereignty should affect the preemption determination by lessening the burden
needed to find preemption of state law. Id. at 143-44. Unlike the application of the
preemption doctrine in most other contexts, federal peremption in the Indian law field is
readily implied-no express congressional statement is required. Id. at 144, 151.
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tribal court existed that could exercise jurisdiction over the case,"
the Court confirmed that tribes possess exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction over disputes arising on the reservation and involving
significant tribal interests.32 As a result, Williams v. Lee became the
catalyst for frequently lengthy and bitter disputes between state and
tribal courts over their respective jurisdictions.33
The tribal exhaustion doctrine adds a new dimension to the
Williams v. Lee debate. As described by the Court, the tribal
exhaustion doctrine confirms Williams v. Lee's commitment to "the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them."' In a jurisdictional dispute between a state and a tribe,
however, Williams v. Lee's determination of exclusive tribal court
31. The Williams v. Lee Court mentioned recent improvements in the Navajo Tribe's
legal system and referred to the Navajo Courts of Indian Offenses's broad criminal and
civil jurisdiction, but the Court neither expressly cited the tribal jurisdictional ordinance
itself nor indicated whether the tribal court in fact had jurisdiction over the matter.
Williams, 358 U.S. at 222.
32. Id. at 223. To underscore the uniqueness of the Williams v. Lee Court's holding
that the Arizona courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over a contract executed by a
Native American and performed on a reservation, the authors of a leading Indian Law
casebook ask: "Is there any place in the world, other than Indian country, where Lee's
contract could have been executed and yet be beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of the
Arizona Superior Courts?" DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW CASES
AND MATERIALS 576 (3d ed. 1993). Professor Robert Laurence has similarly noted the
"unusual result" in the case, and defended its holding by noting that "[t]he sovereignty of
Indian tribes is not only priceless, but especially vulnerable to state intrusions." Robert
Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries: Full
Faith and Credit, Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L. REV. 589, 619 (1990)
[hereinafter Laurence, Enforcement of Judgments].
33. For a comprehensive summary of the wide range of issues implicated by state
court assertions of jurisdiction in cases involving Native Americans or reservation affairs,
see FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 348-80 (Rennard Strickland
et al. eds., 1982). See also William C. Canby, Jr., Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian
Reservation, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 206, 227 (describing the "chaos prevailing in the current
division of jurisdiction between state and tribal courts"); see also infra note 203.
Of course, serious hurdles remain to the enforcement of both a judgment issued by
a tribal court against a non-Indian and a judgment issued by a state court against a
reservation Indian. For an excellent analysis of the enforcement problem in both contexts,
see generally Laurence, Enforcement of Judgments, supra note 32; Fred L. Ragsdale, Jr.,
Problems in the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7 N.M. L. REV. 133
(1977). Some states, such as New Mexico, appear to hold that tribal court decisions are
entitled to full faith and credit. See Pommersheim, Crucible of Sovereignty, supra note 4,
at 342, (citing Jim v. CIT Fin. Serv., 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975)). Another possible
resolution is a state statutory listing of prerequisites for state recognition of tribal court
judgments. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-1-25 (1986) (providing that no order
of a tribal court in South Dakota may be recognized in state courts except under
specifically listed exceptions).
34. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
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jurisdiction renders the tribal court's decision free from subsequent
review by a state court.35 In contrast, the exhaustion rule, which
now guides challenges to tribal jurisdiction when -raised in federal
court, opens the door for subsequent federal review to ensure proper
exercise of tribal judicial power. Thus, in its practical effect, the
Court's broad definition of federal question jurisdiction has opened
the federal courts to many cases involving only a conflicting assertion
of state and tribal court jurisdiction.36
This Article examines the development and subsequent ap-
plication of the tribal exhaustion rule to illustrate how the rule
situates tribal courts among their more established and more powerful
analogues in the state and federal system.37  Analysis of lower
federal court opinions reveals major weaknesses in the exhaustion
doctrine and many inconsistencies in its application. 8 This Article
argues that the exhaustion doctrine has improperly shifted judicial
power in two major ways: in some cases, it expands federal jurisdic-
tion where tribal jurisdiction should be exclusive; 39 in others, it
unduly limits federal jurisdiction by forestalling federal court review
of cases involving significant federal questions.' Based on this
argument, the Article suggests a redefinition of federal question
jurisdiction in Indian law disputes that better allocates the jurisdic-
tional powers of tribal and federal courts.41 This redefinition of
federal jurisdiction in turn supports the Article's subsequent proposal
to eliminate the exhaustion doctrine for cases falling within the
redefined and narrowed scope of federal question jurisdiction.42
Finally, the Article suggests congressional action to provide for
Supreme Court review of tribal court decisions by writ of certiorari,43
thus softening the impact of the Article's earlier proposal to limit
35. Id. at 223.
36. See, e.g., Sanders v. Robinson, 864 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1988) (child custody dispute);
A & A Concrete, Inc. v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 781 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1986)
(breach of contract suit). In a slightly different context, Professor Robert Laurence has
noted that "when it comes to cooperation between states and tribes, the federal
government can be a meddlesome third party." Laurence, Enforcement of Judgments,
supra note 32, at 685. That criticism seems equally applicable to the Supreme Court's
decision in National Farmers to expand its general federal question jurisdiction in Native
American affairs. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 46-87 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 88-193 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 201-18 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 219-98 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 299-316 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 317-30 and accompanying text.
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post-exhaustion federal court review of tribal court decisions.
Although the imposition of ultimate Supreme Court review may not
be necessary to check arbitrary treatment of non-Indians' or other
imagined tribal court abuses of power,45 it provides a realistic
alternative to the federal courts' current power to second guess tribal
court decisions in post-exhaustion cases and, more importantly, an
opportunity for a fuller expansion of tribal court activities.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
TRIBAL REMEDIES
A. The Indian Civil Rights Act
With the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968,46
Congress first imposed on tribal governments guarantees of individual
liberties similar to those contained in the Bill of Rights. 7 As Indian
and non-Indian litigants began to file federal lawsuits alleging
44. The federal district court's opinion in Little Horn State Bank v. Crow Tribal
Court, 690 F. Supp. 919 (D. Mont. 1988), vacated 708 F. Supp. 1561 (D. Mont. 1989), is
frequently cited as evidence of the need for federal court review of tribal court decisions.
See Laurence, Enforcement of Judgments, supra note 32, at 590-605 for analysis of the
Little Horn problem. Laurence urges federal statutory reform to authorize federal court
review of tribal court decisions under the Indian Civil Rights Act. Id. at 601-04.
45. Professor Robert Williams is a vocal opponent of proposals to authorize federal
court review of tribal decisions; he attributes these calls for reform to the "legacy of
European colonialism and racism" in federal Indian law. Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism
in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237, 276 (1989)
[hereinafter Williams, Documents of Barbarism]. Professor Robert Clinton has similarly
argued that federal review of tribal court decisions is unnecessary, describing tribal court
abuses of power as "exceptional" and "episodic" rather than "systematic." Enforcement
of Civil Rights Act: Hearing before the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1988) (remarks of Professor Robert N. Clinton).
46. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982).
47. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 includes protection of the free exercise of
religion and freedom of speech, Fourth Amendment-like protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures, prohibition of double jeopardy, prohibition of compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination, limitations upon the exercise of eminent domain, protection
of the right to a speedy and public trial, Eighth Amendment-like protection against cruel
and unusual punishment, equal protection and due process of law, and insurance of the
right to a jury in certain circumstances. At the same time, however, Congress specifically
failed to include several well-established Bill of Rights provisions, including limitations
prohibiting government establishment of religion, the guarantee of a republican form of
government, a privileges and immunities clause, protection of the right to vote, a guarantee
of free counsel to indigent criminal defendants, and protection of the right to a jury in civil
trials. 25 U.S.C. § 1302. See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62-63, 63
n.14 (1978) (describing differences between the Act and the Constitution).
[Vol. 731098
TRIBAL REMEDIES
violations of the Act, the lower courts developed an exhaustion
doctrine designed to defer ultimate federal review of these issues.4
The exhaustion doctrine, articulated in judicial applications of the
Indian Civil Rights Act and modeled after the established doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, was flexible and pragmatic in
application. A lower court's decision to require exhaustion depended
on the circumstances of each case, including consideration of the
alleged harm, the possible futility of filing suit in a tribal forum, and
the need to preserve and strengthen the sovereign authority of tribal
courts.49  In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,5D however, the
Supreme Court obviated the need for that exhaustion rule by holding
that the Indian Civil Rights Act did not create a federal cause of action. 1
48. See O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1973),
in which, after noting that the Indian Civil Rights Act was passed to guarantee
constitutional rights to the reservation Indian, the court found that "the realization of this
goal is best achieved by maintaining the unique Indian culture and necessarily
strengthening tribal governments. From this perspective an exhaustion requirement is
consistent with the statute." Id. The Cheyenne River court cited the Supreme Court's
holding in Williams v. Lee as establishing the need to preserve the tribal court's authority.
Id. at 1146. Unlike the exhaustion doctrine apparently envisioned by the Court in National
Farmers, however, the Cheyenne River court described a more flexible exhaustion rule:
"[E]xhaustion is not an inflexible requirement. A balancing process is evident; that is
weighing the need to preserve the cultural identity of the tribe by strengthening the
authority of the tribal courts, against the need to immediately adjudicate alleged
deprivations of individual rights." Id. See also Schantz v. White Lighting, 502 F.2d 67,70
n.6 (8th Cir. 1974) (noting that "generally in such Indian civil rights cases there is an
exhaustion requirement"); Oliver v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 424 F. Supp. 487,489 (D.S.D.
1977) (holding, after conducting a Cheyenne River balancing test, that "exhaustion is
particularly appropriate in this case"); McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629, 636 (D. Utah
1973) (refusing to order exhaustion when tribal court remedies were inadequate); Dodge
v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17, 25-26 (D. Ariz. 1968) (holding exhaustion unnecessary because
of federal interest in consolidating claims in one law suit). Cf. National Farmers Union
Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985) ("[E]xamination should be
conducted in the first instance by the Tribal Court itself.").
49. See, e.g., Schantz, 502 F.2d at 70 n.6 (noting that tribal exhaustion might not be
required if tribal remedies are nonexistent or inadequate); Cheyenne River, 482 F.2d at
1146 (describing balancing test federal courts apply to determine whether exhaustion of
tribal remedies is appropriate); Oliver, 424 F. Supp. at 489 (applying balancing test).
50. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
51. Id. at 52. Commentators disagree over whether the Santa Clara decision was based
primarily upon a lack of jurisdiction in the federal court to hear the claim or whether the
result was compelled by the Court's determination that the Indian Civil Rights Act did not
create an implied right of action. Language in the case supports both positions. At one
point in the opinion, for instance, the Court highlighted the tribe's sovereign immunity
from suit: "In the absence here of any unequivocal expression of contrary legislative
intent, we conclude that suits against the Tribe under the Indian Civil Rights Act are
barred by its sovereign immunity from suit." Id. at 59. Several pages later, the Court
emphasized Congress's failure to articulate a private cause of action under the Act:
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In the aftermath of Santa Clara, the federal courthouse doors
seemed firmly closed to litigants challenging tribal compliance with
the Indian Civil Rights Act.52 In response to the lower courts'
faithful application of Santa Clara, litigants fashioned a new collateral
means of attack in federal court. Rather than attacking the tribal
action directly as violative of a specific provision of the Indian Civil
Rights Act, litigants began filing federal complaints alleging an
absence of tribal power to engage in the challenged activity, thereby
Courts must be more than usually hesitant to infer from [Congress's] silence a
cause of action that, while serving one legislative purpose, will disserve the other.
Creation of a Federal cause of action for the enforcement of rights created in
Title I [of the Indian Civil Rights Act], however useful it might be in securing
compliance with § 1302, plainly would be at odds with the congressional goal of
protecting tribal self-government.
Id. at 64; see Kevin J. Worthen, Shedding New Light on an Old Debate: A Federal Indian
Law Perspective on Congressional Authority to Limit Federal Question Jurisdiction, 75
MINN. L. REv. 65, 88-90 (1990). Worthen admitted that a colorable claim may be made
that the Santa Clara decision was based on the Court's conclusion that the Indian Civil
Rights Act did not impliedly create a private cause of action. Id. at 88-89. He ultimately
concluded, however, that a close examination of the entire decision, the ensuing results,
and subsequent lower federal court and tribal decisions reveals that the Court's ruling was
essentially a jurisdictional one that focused on the forum in which the claim may be
brought rather than on the type of litigants bringing the action. Id. at 89. Worthen based
his conclusion in part on the fact that, unlike a typical case denying a litigant access to the
courts because of the lack of an implied right of action, the Santa Clara Court merely
precluded federal forum relief. Id. In other words, the Court did not hold that claims
arising under the Indian Civil Rights Act could not be brought at all by private litigants,
but rather that the federal courts lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims. In
addition, Worthen drew support from the fact that a typical no-implied-right-of-action case
will provide that a federal official has the sole power to enforce the statute in question,
with the consequence that federal court review of the statute remains undiminished. Id.
at 90. This was not the result of the Santa Clara decision.
52. The sole noteworthy exception was the Tenth Circuit's decision in Dry Creek
Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1118 (1981). In that case, the court confirmed federal court jurisdiction to enter
a large damages award against a tribe in a suit brought by non-Indian plaintiffs alleging
that tribal action denying her access to her on-reservation property violated the Indian
Civil Rights Act. Id. at 685. The Dry Creek Lodge opinion, however, did not garner
widespread support and in fact has been narrowly construed by its own authors. See, e.g.,
Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 892 F.2d 1457, 1460 (10th Cir. 1989) (explaining that
the Dry Creek Lodge exception should be available only "where the dispute does not
concern internal tribal issues, the plaintiff is non-Indian, and tribal remedies are
unavailable"); see also White v. Pueblo of San Juan, 728 F.2d 1307, 1312 (10th Cir. 1984)
("Necessarily the Dry Creek opinion must be regarded as requiring narrow interpretation
... ."); Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 315, 319
n.4 (10th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that Dry Creek Lodge exception to tribal sovereign
immunity is limited to cases involving "particularly egregious allegations of personal
restraint and deprivations of personal rights").
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recasting the dispute as jurisdictional in nature5  In National
Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,' the
Supreme Court agreed that these jurisdictional challenges did indeed
arise under federal law for the purpose of establishing federal
question jurisdiction, but instructed the lower courts to stay their hand
until the litigants had exhausted their tribal remedies.'
B. The Supreme Court Speaks-National Farmers and Iowa Mutual
Although the facts underlying National Farmers involved routine
questions of negligence and liability insurance coverage, the five
courts issuing opinions in the case never came close to reaching the
merits of the dispute5 Leroy Sage, a minor and a member of the
Crow Tribe, was injured when a motorcycle struck him in his school
parking lot.5 The school, owned and operated by the State of
Montana, was located on fee land58 within the boundaries of the
53. See, e.g., Snow v. Quinault Indian Nation, 709 F.2d 1319,1321 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1214 (1984).
54. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
55. Id. at 857.
56. Because the defendant insurance company failed to appear, the tribal court simply
entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 848. The defendant then took
up the matter in the federal district court. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians, 560 F. Supp. 213 (D. Mont. 1983), rev'd, 736 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). The district court first held that no federal statute or treaty
delegated civil jurisdiction over non-Indians to the Crow Tribe. Id. at 216. It then held
that the Crow Tribe was implicitly divested of its civil jurisdiction over torts committed by
non-Indians. Id. at 216-17. Upon review, the circuit court of appeals reversed the trial
court and dismissed the case upon jurisdictional grounds. National Farmers Union Ins.
Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Neither the
constitution nor the Indian Civil Rights Act provides a basis for a federal cause of action.
... National's complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim for federal relief."),
rev'd, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). The Supreme Court likewise found no occasion to remark
upon the merits of the dispute during its formulation of the new exhaustion policy.
National Farmers, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
57. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 847.
58. Private, non-Indian ownership in fee of land within Indian reservations came about
principally through the operation of the General Allotment Act of 1887, Act of February
8, 1887, Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). The General
Allotment Act, along with other allotment acts of more restricted scope, served ultimately
to transfer tribally owned lands into private hands. The allotment acts granted relatively
small parcels-generally 40 to 160 acres-to individual Indians. The parcels were initially
to be held in trust by the United States for a 25-year period before being transferred
outright to the individual Native American.
Most of the land that passed out of trust status was eventually transferred to non-
Indians, oftentimes for meager consideration. See FELIX S. COHEN, supra note 33, at 130.
By 1934, when the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 462 (1988), put a halt to further
allotments and extended in perpetuity the trust period of lands still held by the U.S., huge
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Crow Indian Reservation.59 Sage's guardian ified a complaint in the
Crow Tribal Court against the school district, seeking compensation
for medical expenses and damages for pain and suffering.' Process
was served on the Chairman of the School Board, who failed to
inform the school district of the pending lawsuit.61
The tribal court entered a default judgment against the school
district. Several days later, the school district and its insurance
company sought relief in federal district court, alleging general federal
question jurisdiction over their complaint and challenging the tribal
court's power to enter the default judgment.6' The district court
granted a permanent injunction against execution of the default tribal
court judgment, stating that the Crow Tribal Court had no subject
matter jurisdiction over the underlying tort.63 The Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court and vacated its injunction. The court of
appeals concluded that the district court itself lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the school district's complaint and held that challeng-
es to the scope of the tribal court's adjudicatory power did not arise
under federal law.'
amounts of land had passed into non-Indian ownership. The allotment acts also provided
for the outright sale of unallotted, "surplus" lands. These lands often comprised the lion's
share of the reservation. Estimates of the total amount of acreage lost range from
approximately 41 million acres, GETCHFS ET AL., supra note 32, at 191, to more than 90
million acres, COHEN, supra note 33, at 614. As a result of Allotment Act policy, land
ownership within many reservations resembles a checkerboard today, with non-Indian-
owned parcels scattered throughout. The end result is a regulatory nightmare for many
tribal governments.
For a sharp critique of Supreme Court opinions concluding that implementation of
the Allotment Act resulted in decreased tribal sovereignty, see Singer, supra note 22, at
20-30.
59. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 847.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 848.
63. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 560 F. Supp. 213,217
(D. Mont. 1983), rev'd, 736 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
64. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320, 1323
(9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). The court construed Supreme Court precedent
as establishing federal court jurisdiction to resolve disputes over "tribal regulatoryjurisdiction" and declined to extend that jurisdiction to "the question whether a tribe has
abused its adjudicatory jurisdiction." Id. The opinion reveals several bases for this
holding: First, the court rejected as "untenable" the assertion that "the tribe's adjudicatory
authority must be coextensive with its regulatory authority"; the court stressed that "cases
are commonly adjudicated in forums that would lack the authority to regulate the subject
matter of the disputes." Id. at 1322 n.3. Second, because the creation of a cause of action
under federal common law is an "unusual course," and because Congress had already
expressed its intent that federal review of alleged abuses of tribal court adjudicatory
jurisdiction be limited to petitions for habeas corpus brought under the Indian Civil Rights
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The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that
federal subject matter jurisdiction was not lacking." The case raised
a federal question, the Court reasoned, because "[t]he question
whether an Indian tribe retains the power to compel a non-Indian
property owner to submit to the civil jurisdiction of a tribal court is
one that must be answered by reference to federal law."'  At the
same time, however, the Court announced that the school district and
its insurance company must first challenge the tribal court's action in
the appropriate tribal forum.67 Only upon exhaustion of tribal court
remedies would the federal courts hear a challenge to "either the
merits or any question concerning appropriate reliet"'
Two years after National Farmers, the tribal exhaustion rule was
reiterated and slightly expanded to encompass diversity cases. In
Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante69 the Court concluded that,
although the federal court had jurisdiction over the underlying
personal injury dispute pursuant to the diversity statute,70 deference
to tribal courts and general notions of tribal sovereignty again
required the federal court to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction
until the tribal court had completed its review.7' In the majority
opinion, Justice Marshall articulated the somewhat anomalous
position that because the statutory language and legislative history of
the diversity statute make no mention of tribal courts, and because
tribal courts were nonexistent when diversity jurisdiction was first
authorized by Congress, the statute could not be read as intending to
permit the intrusion on tribal sovereignty that diversity jurisdiction
represents 2 Notwithstanding Justice Marshall's historical analy-
sis,73 the holding ultimately confirms the existence of federal
Act, the court rejected the insurance company's argument that its claim could properly be
heard under federal common law. Id. at 1322.
65. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857.
66. Id. at 852.
67. Id. at 856.
68. Id. The Court left the procedural posture of the federal action pending tribal
court adjudication to the discretion of the federal courts: "Whether the federal action
should be dismissed, or merely held in abeyance pending the development of further
Tribal Court proceedings, is a question that should be addressed in the first instance by
the District Court." Id. at 857.
69. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
71. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 16.,
72. Id. at 17-18.
73. See Pommersheim, Crucible of Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 347-51. Citing pre-
Iowa Mutual cases, Pommersheim first noted that the federal courts have viewed diversity
jurisdiction as a method of filling in jurisdictional voids. Id. at 348-50. Pommersheim went
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statutory diversity jurisdiction;74 it merely postpones the exercise of
that jurisdiction until after the tribal court has resolved the dispute.
Justice Stevens, author of the National Farmers opinion, filed the
sole dissent in Iowa Mutual. In his view, the federal courts should
exercise their diversity jurisdiction in all cases in which the statutory
prerequisites are met; to refuse to do so, he argued, improperly
"requires the federal court to avoid adjudicating the merits of a
controversy also pending in tribal court although it could reach those
merits if the case instead were pending in state court."'75 That
inconsistency, according to Stevens, wrongly elevates the sovereignty
of the tribe over the sovereignty of the state.
on to discuss Iowa Mutual's impact on this practice:
The Court in Iowa Mutual... seemed to cast significant doubt about the
vitality of the doctrine of diversity jurisdiction as a potential jurisdictional gap-
filler when it noted that the diversity statute makes no specific reference to
Indians and, in fact, Indians were not even considered state citizens when the
statute was adopted in 1789. Application of the diversity doctrine in federal
courts today is also clearly at odds with current federal Indian policy supporting
tribal court development.
Id. at 350 (citation omitted). Pommersheim concluded with what he perceived to be the
greatest flaw in the application of diversity jurisdiction in this context-its potentially
discriminatory effects.
Diversity jurisdiction is premised on the notion that in-state plaintiffs have ready,
if not favorable, access to state forums, and diversity jurisdiction allows a non-
resident plaintiff access to a more neutral federal forum. But this scheme breaks
down in the context of diversity in the tribal court situation because no plaintiff
has access to a state forum.
Id. at 350-51 (citation omitted).
Pommersheim's concerns can be assuaged, however, if one merely substitutes "a non-
federal forum" in place of "a state forum." In other words, diversity jurisdiction need not
be viewed narrowly as only providing a choice between state and federal court. It may
instead be viewed more broadly in this context as offering a choice between a federal and
a non-federal court. That there is often no state forum available is largely irrelevant, for
when a matter is properly cognizable as arising under a tribal court's jurisdiction, that
tribal court effectively stands in the stead of the state court.
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Iowa Mutual, dismissed
any question regarding the propriety of diversity jurisdiction in the case by noting that the
complaint as filed in the district court failed to "raise any question concerning thejurisdiction of the Blackfeet Tribal Court. For purposes of our decision, it is therefore
appropriate to assume that the Tribal Court had concurrent jurisdiction over the dispute."
Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 20 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. 480 U.S. at 18-19; see also id. at 22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("I of course agree with the Court's conclusion that the Federal District Court had
subject-matter jurisdiction over the case ....").
75. Id. at 22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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C. The Policy Underlying the Exhaustion Doctrine
To date, National Farmers and Iowa Mutual constitute the
Supreme Court's only pronouncements on the tribal exhaustion
doctrine.76 Because they establish new principles of federal Indian
law, scrutiny of the opinions might be expected to reveal the
underlying concerns that guided the decisions to create the new rules.
But the decisions are not especially illuminating.
Somewhat surprisingly, the National Farmers Court never
indicated that it was embarking on a new course. In fact, the Court
devoted only a scant two paragraphs to the justifications for its
holding. Broadly defining tribal exhaustion as a rule that allows "the
forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to
evaluate the factual and legal bases for the challenge,"' the Court
provided three rationales for the new doctrine. First and foremost,
the Court reiterated its recognition of Congressional commitment to
the "policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-deter-
mination."78 Second, the Court noted that allowing the tribal court
to develop a full record prior to federal court involvement furthered
the efficient administration of justice 9 Finally, the Court suggested
that the exhaustion doctrine would enhance the legitimacy of the
tribal court system, thereby encouraging the tribal courts to explain
their actions to the parties before them and making the benefits of
their expertise available to federal courts during post-exhaustion
review.' °
76. The Court has mentioned the tribal exhaustion cases in only three other Native
American cases. In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987),
Iowa Mutual was cited as support for the proposition that Congress has an "overriding
goal of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development." Id. at 216. In
Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987), a non-Indian habeas corpus case raising questions
about the exhaustion of state remedies, the Court referred to the tribal exhaustion doctrine
as "an inflexible bar to consideration of the merits of the petition by the federal court,"
thus suggesting that the doctrine is not subject to discretionary and flexible application for
the lower courts. Id. at 131. See infra notes 88-142 and accompanying text. Finally, in
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989), the plurality emphasized that National Farmers and Iowa Mutual established only
that the tribal courts have the initial power to determine the scope of their own
jurisdiction, subject to subsequent federal review. Id. at 427 n.10.




80. Id. at 857.
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While reaffirming the basic National Farmers holding, the Iowa
Mutual Court elaborated on the justifications for tribal exhaustion."1
Describing the doctrine's promotion of tribal sovereignty, the Court
reasoned that a failure to require exhaustion would place the federal
courts in direct competition with tribal courts.' Moreover, the Iowa
Mutual Court noted that tribal appellate court jurisdiction would be
completely circumvented if the federal courts heard direct challenges
to the tribal trial courts' jurisdictional holdings.' The Court took
care to reemphasize, however, that the tribal court's holding on its
own jurisdiction was ultimately subject to review in the federal district
court.84
The tenor of Justice Marshall's analysis makes clear that the only
alternative to the exhaustion rule considered by the Court was
"unconditional access to the federal forum."' From that perspec-
tive, exhaustion is clearly more respectful of the sovereign powers of
the tribes and their courts. By shifting the basis of comparison,
however, the potentially destructive effects of the exhaustion rule on
tribal sovereignty become apparent. For example, the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in National Farmers concluded that the federal courts had no
subject matter jurisdiction whatsoever to review the tribal court's
decision on the scope of its adjudicatory jurisdiction.' When
compared to that holding, the tribal exhaustion rule represents a
significantly more intrusive involvement in tribal court affairs.'
81. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16-20 (1987).
82. Id. at 16.
83. Id. at 17.
84. Id. at 19; see also National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856 (emphasizing that tribal
court should develop a full record before the merits are addressed by a federal court).
85. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 16.
86. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320, 1323
(1984), rev'd 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
87. Commentators disagree about the exhaustion rule's impact upon tribal sovereignty.
Some critics concentrate on the rule's obvious benefits. See, e.g., Pommersheim, Crucible
of Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 329 (arguing that the "special force" of the exhaustion rule
is its "explicit rules which curb the most prevalent attempts to undermine and circumvent
tribal court jurisdiction"); Resnik, supra note 24, at 733 (asserting that the tribal exhaustion
rule effectively accords tribal courts greater deference than the state courts enjoy since the
tribal courts are less likely than the state courts to apply federal law); Frickey, supra note
11, at 1234 (noting that by the construction of the exhaustion rule, "the Supreme Court
has given tribal courts the chance to show. that they can fairly and effectively litigate civil
disputes involving non-Indian defendants"); Taylor, supra note 9, at 233 (describing
National Farmers as based on "the federal policy of tribal self-government and self-
determination").
Other critics have looked beyond the exhaustion rule's silver lining and focused upon
its cloud. See, e.g., Clinton, Legacy of Conquest, supra note 10, at 150-51.
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III. TRIBAL EXHAUSTION AFTER NATIONAL FARMERS AND IOWA
MUTUAL
A. Beyond the Easy Cases
Although the scope and possible applications of the Supreme
Court's tribal exhaustion doctrine are still uncertain, a few il-
luminating beacons have emerged in lower court decisions. The
courts have unanimously agreed, for example, that the tribal
exhaustion rule applies to lawsuits seeking redress for an alleged
breach of contract,8 tort,8 9 or trespass' occurring on the reser-
[Tihe ultimate Federal cause of action that the Court invented in [the exhaustion
rule] reflects the ultimate colonialist distrust of leaving the final resolution of such
questions to tribal governance. This result is all the more remarkable since the
Federal Full Faith and Credit Act seems to require all courts within the United
States to give full faith and credit to tribal court judgments. If a state court had
ruled that it had subject matter jurisdiction over a controversy, the question
might be reviewed on direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court if the
alleged subject matter jurisdiction defect raised a federal question. Since the final
judgment would be accorded full faith and credit, there would be absolutely no
possibility of initiating a new action in federal court to attack that ruling. By
contrast, National Farmers Union and [Iowa Mutual support wholesale rejection
and displacement of tribal court judgments if the federal district court disagrees
with tribal adjudication of the scope of tribal subject matter jurisdiction over
nonmembers.
Id. (citations omitted); see also supra notes 9-11.
88. See, e.g., A & A Concrete, Inc. v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 781 F.2d 1411,
1413-16 (9th Cir. 1986); Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668,
673-74 (8th Cir. 1986). Although the Weeks court ruled that it would be improper for the
federal court to hear the lawsuit, the court did not order exhaustion of tribal remedies.
Id. at 672-74, 676. Rather, the Weeks court interpreted the tribal exhaustion rule as
applying only when a party seeks to challenge the jurisdiction of the tribal court over a
case currently pending before that court. Id. at 672 n.3. The Seventh Circuit recently
endorsed the Weeks court's rationale on that issue. Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg.
Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 814-15 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 621 (1993). Although the
Supreme Court has not considered this issue, other lower courts have expressly refused to
limit the tribal exhaustion rule in that way. As those courts have noted, concerns for tribal
sovereignty are equally implicated, regardless of the pendency of a tribal proceeding, any
time the federal court is asked to resolve a lawsuit that falls within the scope of tribal court
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294,1299-1300 (8th Cir. 1994); Texaco, Inc. v. Zah, 5 F.3d 1374,1375
(10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Plainbull, 957 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 1992); Crawford v.
Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1991); Burlington N.R.R. v. Crow
Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Tsosie, 849 F.
Supp. 768,70-71 (D.N.M. 1994); Cropmate Co. v. Indian Resources Int'l, Inc., 840 F. Supp.
744, 747 n.3 (D. Mont. 1993); Kaul v. Wahquahboshkuk, 838 F. Supp. 515,517-18 (D. Kan.
1993); Middlemist v. Department of Interior, 824 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D. Mont. 1993).
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vation and filed against a tribal entity or Native American defendant.
The decided cases have involved lawsuits filed by both Indian9 and
non-Indian' plaintiffs; in every case, tribal ordinances authorized the
tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction.
Beyond the clear core of tribal exhaustion cases described above,
the unanimity of the lower federal courts gives way in their decisions
on the addition of off-reservation contacts or interests, the presence
of state or federal statutory issues, and challenges to the tribe's ability
to regulate the activities of a non-Indian. A review of the cases
reveals a broad spectrum of approaches-ranging from a somewhat
begrudging acceptance of tribal exhaustion on the one hand, to
extreme federal court deference to tribal court proceedings on the
other. In fact, these cases parallel the range of state court opinions
generated by the Supreme Court's Williams v. Lee analysis, in which
the Court first began to sketch the boundaries of exclusive tribal court
jurisdiction in the context of an encroaching state court system.9
Some lower federal courts, seemingly reluctant to apply the
Supreme Court's National Farmers rule, have ordered exhaustion of
tribal remedies only after placing the tribal court on a very short
leash. In these cases, the courts have noted their displeasure with the
plaintiffs' treatment on the reservation and conditioned their
89. See, e.g., Whitebird v. Kickapoo Hous. Auth., 751 F. Supp. 928, 930 (D. Kan.
1990); Williams v. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, 625 F. Supp. 1457, 1459 (D. Nev. 1986).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Turtle Mountain Hous. Auth., 816 F.2d 1273, 1275-77
(8th Cir. 1987).
91. See, e.g., Wellman v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 815 F.2d 577, 578 (9th Cir. 1987).
92. See, e.g., A & A Concrete, Inc., 781 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1986).
93. See, e.g., Enriquez v. Superior Court, 565 P.2d 522, 523 (Ariz. Ct. App., 1977)
(applying Williams v. Lee to action, brought by non-Indians against Indians, arising from
a car accident on a state highway within a reservation); Little Horn State Bank v. Stops,
555 P.2d 211, 215 (Mont. 1976) (refusing to enjoin enforcement of state court judgment
against Native American defendant on the reservation). Noting that the underlying
transaction occurred off the reservation, the Little Horn court refused to allow the Indians
to "retreat to the sanctuary of the reservation for protection." Id. at 214. For a persuasive
argument that Little Horn was wrongly decided, see Laurence, Enforcement of Judgments,
supra note 32, at 594-607; see also State ex rel Old Elk v. District Court, 552 P.2d 1394,
1398 (Mont. 1976) (holding that an Indian may not commit a crime off the reservation and
then shield himself from criminal enforcement by returning to the reservation) (" 'The
myth of Indian sovereignty has pervaded judicial attempts by state courts to deal with
contemporary Indian problems. Such rationale must yield to the realities of modern life,
both on and off the reservation.' ") (quoting Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 517 P.2d 893, 897
(Mont. 1974)); Natewa v. Natewa, 499 P.2d 691, 693 (N.M. 1972) (refusing to find exclusive
jurisdiction in the tribal court to determine child support obligations) ("Appellant cannot
interpose his special status as an Indian as a shield to protect him from obligations that
result from his marriage to appellee which had been entered into off the reservation.").
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willingness to order exhaustion on the tribal court's compliance with
the federal court's own view of proper judicial procedure. 4 In one
case, in fact, the federal district court expressly declared that it would
reassert its jurisdiction in the case if the tribal court allowed the tribe
or the Native American defendant to engage in self-help with regard
to the plaintiff's property, or if the tribal court failed to provide at
least three days' notice of any order it planned to enforce.95
Other courts, though apparently more supportive of the Supreme
Court's holdings, have crafted broad exceptions to remove cases from
the rule's scope. One court has suggested, for instance, that exhaus-
94. See, e.g., Tom's Amusement Co. v. Cuthbertson, 816 F. Supp. 403 (W.D.N.C.
1993). In this case, a Georgia corporation sued a non-Indian owner of a gaming
establishment on the Cherokee Indian Reservation, alleging a default in payments under
a contract to install gaming equipment at the defendant's place of business on the
reservation. Id. at 404. Although both parties to the dispute were non-Indian, the tribe's
ordinance provided that the tribal court" 'shall exercise jurisdiction over all persons, firms,
corporations, partnerships or other legal business entities which conduct business on
Cherokee trust lands.' " Id. at 405 (quoting Rules of Court for the Cherokee Court of
Indian Offenses § 1-2(e)). Noting that the contract itself mandated compliance with the
tribe's gaming ordinance, and that the defendant held a gaming license issued by the tribe,
the court recognized its obligation to adhere to the Supreme Court's rule of deference to
the exercise of tribal court jurisdiction. Id. at 406. At the same time, though, the court
noted its "displeasure" at the plaintiff's situation and treatment. Id. at 407. According to
the facts as presented to the district court, defendant aparently did not object to the
plaintiff's proposal to remove the gaming machines, concededly owned by the plaintiff, yet
the defendant continued to assert that the contractual payments due to the plaintiff were
illegal under the tribe's gaming ordinance. Id. at 406-07. As a result, the court issued a
stay of federal court proceedings to allow exhaustion of tribal remedies, but stipulated that
it would lift the stay if the defendant or the tribe engaged in "self-help" with regard to
plaintiff's gaming machines or if the tribal court failed to provide a minimum of three
days' notice to the plaintiff of any action to be taken pursuant to a tribal court order. Id.
at 407. The court also listed two other situations in which the stay should be lifted:
exhaustion of tribal court remedies, or a finding by the tribal court that it does not have
or declines to exercise jurisdiction in the case. Id.
In Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 788 F. Supp. 566 (S.D. Fla. 1992),
rev'd on other grounds, 999 F.2d 503 (11th Cir. 1993), the district court also issued orders
staying the federal case, and noting that the stay would be "automatically lifted ... upon
the use of self-help by the Tribe, or upon the provision of less than two business days'
notice to Tamiami Partners of impending action pursuant to a Tribal Court order." Id. at
570. The Eleventh Circuit's reversal of the district court's orders was based on its
conclusion that the underlying complaint had failed to state a federal cause of action.
Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 999 F.2d. 503, 507 (11th Cir, 1993). The
court remanded the case to the district court, however, concluding that "We are now
aware of facts which suggest that the district court could have jurisdiction if the case arose
today." Id. at 508.
95. Tom's Amusement Co., 816 F. Supp. at 407. The court also indicated that it would
exercise jurisdiction in the case in the event of a tribal court holding of no jurisdiction or
upon exhaustion of tribal remedies. Id. The court did not, however, specify what the
source of its federal court jurisdiction over the contract dispute would be.
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tion of tribal remedies is appropriate only when the dispute involves
"internal tribal affairs., 96 Another has held that the exhaustion rule
is not triggered when the parties raise preliminary jurisdictional
questions that cast doubt on the tribe's ability to assert sovereign
power in the dispute. 7 Still other courts have created procedural
barriers to the exhaustion rule, suggesting that exhaustion is not
required when no tribal court proceeding is pending at the time the
federal lawsuit is filed.98
In contrast to the careful, grudging application of the tribal
exhaustion rule by some lower federal courts, others have required
exhaustion in almost every case involving a Native American party or
tribe. In these more deferential courts, exhaustion is used to allow
the tribal court to rule on the scope of the tribe's legislative jurisdic-
tion,99 to determine whether a tribe's cancellation of a lease violated
96. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian
Community, 991 F.2d 458, 463 (8th Cir. 1993) (refusing to require exhaustion because
"[t]he only remedies are those created in the [Tribe's nuclear radiation control] ordinance
itself, and those remedies are void by virtue of the ordinance's preemption [by the federal
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act]. This leaves NSP with nothing to exhaust.");
Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405,1407 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[D]eference to tribal
courts is not required when the disputed issue is not a 'reservation affair' or did not 'ar[i]se
on the reservation' " (quoting Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 942 F.2d 655, 661 (9th Cir.
1991)) (second alteration in original)); Burlington N.R.R. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899,
901 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Burlington Northern's failure to exhaust is not a bar to
jurisdiction . ... The complaint presents issues of federal, not tribal, law .... "), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992); see also United States v. Turtle Mountain Hous. Auth., 816
F.2d 1273, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that exhaustion is "especially appropriate" here
because the "facts tend to demonstrate that this is a purely internal tribal controversy").
97. See also United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853,860-61 (9th Cir. 1986)("In National Farmers, the Court required exhaustion because the tribal court's power to
exercise jurisdiction was not 'automatically foreclosed.' Where the tribal court lacksjurisdiction, however, exhaustion is not required." (citation omitted)). Under this
approach, any litigant could seemingly avoid exhaustion by appropriately crafting his or
her pleadings. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie, 856
F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1988).
98. See, e.g., Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d at 901 n.2 ("Burlington Northern's failure to
exhaust is not a bar to jurisdiction .... [No proceeding is pending in any tribal court.
... " (citations omitted)); Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668,
672 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986); cases cited supra note 93. Contra Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co.,
947 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[w]hether proceedings are actually
pending in the appropriate tribal court is irrelevant" to the federal courts' duty to require
exhaustion of tribal court remedies).
99. Justice Scalia, dissenting in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891
(1993), provided a succinct description of the term: "[Legislative jurisdiction] refers to the
authority of a state to make its law applicable to persons or activities and is quite a
separate matter from jurisdiction to adjudicate." Id. at 2918 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quotations omitted). In Iowa Mutual, the Supreme Court noted that "the Tribe's
adjudicative jurisdiction was coextensive with its legislative jurisdiction," thus signaling the
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federal law,"° to send the United States to tribal court in its efforts
to enforce federal law against a tribal member, 1° or in any case in
validity of applying this concept to Indian law. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S.
9, 12 (1987). Nevertheless, the Court has not yet considered whether cases in which the
tribe allegedly lacks legislative jurisdiction should be treated differently than cases in which
the parties dispute the tribe's ability to exercise its adjudicatory jurisdiction to resolve the
dispute before it. To complicate matters further, the Supreme Court itself and many lower
courts use the term "regulatory jurisdiction" instead of "legislative jurisdiction." E.g.,
South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309,2315 n.6, 2316 (1993); National Farmers Union
Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320, 1323 nA (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S.
845 (1985).
For an example of a case in which the court ordered exhaustion of tribal remedies in
a challenge to the tribe's legislative jurisdiction, see Burlington N.R.R. v. Crow Tribal
Council, 940 F.2d 1239,1245-46 (9th Cir. 1991). In that case, the court ordered exhaustion
of tribal court remedies in a challenge to a Crow Tribe ordinance purporting to regulate
railroads crossing the reservation. Id. at 1240-42, 1245. Basic to the court's analysis was
the conclusion that exhaustion was compelled by three policy considerations:
The policy of tribal self-government and self-determination goes to the heart
of this case. Through the challenged ordinance, the Tribe reasserts its commit-
ment to sovereign authority over Reservation affairs....
The practical imperative of judicial efficiency also compels exhaustion of
tribal remedies.... Here the Tribe itself is in the best position to develop the
necessary factual record for disposition on the merits....
Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized that "[e]xhaustion of tribal court
remedies ... will encourage tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise
basis for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide other courts with the benefit
of their expertise in such matters in the event of further judicial review."
Id. at 1245-46 (alteration in original) (quoting National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985)); see also Middlemist v. Secretary of the U.S.
Dep't of Interior, 824 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D. Mont. 1993), aff'd 19 F. 3d 1318 (9th Cir.
1994). ("Plaintiffs are suing Tribal officials and seek to invalidate a Tribal ordinance.
Unquestionably, this case is a 'reservation affair' which triggers the mandatory exhaustion
requirement" (quoting Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 942 F.2d 655,661 (9th Cir. 1991)); Kaul
v. Wahquahboshkuk, 838 F. Supp. 515, 516-18 (D. Kan. 1993) (requiring exhaustion to
allow the tribal court to determine whether the tribe has the power to apply a tribal
business license requirement and tax to a non-Indian doing business on the reservation).
100. See Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 798 F.2d 1324, 1331 (10th Cir. 1986)
(holding that exhaustion of tribal court remedies was required when the tribe effectively
terminated Superior Oil's leases by refusing to grant permission to conduct predrilling
seismic exploration and remanding to the district court to determine whether the actions
of the tribe were motivated by bad faith, in which case exhaustion would not be required).
101. See United States v. Plainbull, 957 F.2d 724,728 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The fact that the
Government is attempting to enforce federal law is immaterial. The alleged trespass was
to tribal land and considerations of comity require that the tribal courts get the first
opportunity to resolve this case."); see also United States v. Tsosie, 849 F. Supp. 768, 769
(D.N.M. 1994) (ordering the litigants to tribal court for resolution of a suit brought by the
United States on its own behalf and on behalf of a Navajo claimant alleging ownership
rights under the General Allotment Act of. 1887, notwithstanding the objections of all
parties involved in the lawsuit).
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which the tribal courts' assertion of jurisdiction is at least "color-
able"'" or "plausible."'" In one of the more extreme examples
of judicial willingness to require exhaustion of tribal remedies, one
district court recently ordered the parties to tribal court"°4 notwith-
standing opposition by the United States and the other two parties to
the lawsuit,"5 the fact that the land in dispute was not located on a
reservation,'06 and the fact that both Native Americans claiming the
land based their claims, respectively, on federal statutory law and an
Executive Order."° In fairness to the lower federal courts, inconsis-
tent interpretations of the tribal exhaustion doctrine stem not only
from the courts' differing attitudes about the competency of tribal
courts3  and the proper delineation of tribal court jurisdiction, but
102. Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). In Stock
West, the court concluded:
Whether Colville Tribal law applies to a tort that involved certain acts committed
on reservation land and other acts committed outside its territorial jurisdiction
to induce another to perform a contract on tribal lands presents a colorable
question that must be resolved in the first instance by the Colville Tribal Courts.
Id.
103. Id. at 919 (citing A & A Concrete, Inc. v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 782 F.2d
1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1986)). The court explained that "[b]y colorable we mean that on the
record before us, the assertion of tribal court jurisdiction is plausible and appears to have
a valid or genuine basis." Id. See also Espil v. Sells, 847 F. Supp. 752, 758 (D. Ariz. 1994)
(equating "colorable" and "plausible") (quoting Stock West, 964 F.2d at 919); Cropmate
Co. v. Indian Resources, Int'l, 840 F. Supp. 744, 747-48 (D. Mont. 1993) (same).
104. United States v. Tsosie, 849 F. Supp. 768, 769 (D.N.M. 1994).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 769-70.
108. Tribal justice systems vary tremendously in size, structure, funding, independence
from the tribal council, and in the existence of written constitutions, codes, and procedural
rules. Although most systems are underfunded and understaffed, THE INDIAN CIVIL
RIGHTS ACr: REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 37-44
(June 1991) [hereinafter INDIAN CIVIL RIGrrs Acr REPORT], a clear range of
sophistication and judicial expertise exists. In 1992, for instance, the courts of the Navajo
Nation handled 85,014 cases. Indian Tribal Justice Act: Hearings on H.R. 1268 Before the
Subcomm. on Native American Affairs of the Comm. on Natural Resources, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 84 (1993) (testimony of Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation). The
Navajo court system includes seven district trial courts, a family court in each district, an
appellate court, and a traditional Navajo Peacemaker Court. Id. The tribe has a published
code and caselaw reporter, and a bar association. INDIAN CIVIL RIOHTS Acr: REPORT,
supra, at 33. In stark contrast, the Pueblo of Cochiti (population 970) handled 14 cases
in 1983 in a traditional forum. The governor of the tribe serves as the judge, applying
traditional Pueblo laws and customs, which are orally conveyed to each generation.
Informal agreements exist among neighboring pueblos for mutual recognition of judicial
decisions and orders. The Pueblo Council hears appeals. Id. at 77. Although size and
caseload admittedly do not determine the ability of the tribal forum to resolve disputes
brought before it, U.S. federal judges are likely to hesitate before consigning a multimillion
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from uncertainties created by the Supreme Court's opinions them-
selves. In the next section, this Article examines the unanswered
tribal exhaustion questions and explores possible resolutions.
B. Uncertainties Underlying the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine
1. When Does the Exhaustion Doctrine Apply?
When the Supreme Court first articulated the tribal exhaustion
rule, it provided few hints about when the lower courts should apply
it. The National Farmers Court described the doctrine as intended to
answer "the question whether a tribal court has the power to exercise
civil subject-matter jurisdiction over non-Indians in a case of this
kind."' 9  By "case of this kind," the Supreme Court could have
meant that exhaustion is appropriate only in personal injury cases
arising on a reservation;"' in cases in which a tribal court has issued
a default judgment and the losing party has failed to appeal that
holding through the tribal court system; in cases in which a tribal
court has begun proceedings prior to the filing of the federal
lawsuit;"' or, more broadly, in any case in which tribal court
adjudicatory jurisdiction is not "automatically foreclosed""' either
by Congress, by established judicial rule, or by longstanding practice
and understanding on the part of the federal government.
dollar lawsuit whose resolution depends on non-tribal issues to a forum unfamiliar with the
underlying legal issues, especially when that forum is not constrained by federal
constitutional limitations.
109. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855
(1985).
110. In fact, Justice Blackmun's concurring and dissenting opinion in Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation describes the exhaustion rule
as requiring that "the issue of jurisdiction over a civil suit brought against a non-Indian
arising from a tort occurring on reservation land must be resolved in the tribal courts in the
first instance." 492 U.S. 408, 455 n.5 (1989) (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (citing Iowa Mut.
Ins. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987)) (emphasis added).
111. For those courts the exhaustion rule is merely one of timing and will never bar
federal review in the absence of a pending tribal proceeding. See cases cited supra note
98.
112. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855 ("[W]e conclude that the answer to the
question whether a tribal court has the power to exercise civil subject-matter jurisdiction
over non-Indians in a case of this kind is not automatically foreclosed, as an extension of
Oliphant would require." (footnote omitted)). The National Farmers Court distinguished
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), on the ground that, in Oliphant,
the Court found extensive documentation of both the legislative and executive branches'
intention to deny tribal courts criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. National Farmers,
471 U.S. at 876. No comparable evidence indicated the government's position on the role
of tribal courts in civil disputes between Indians and non-Indians. Id.
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Predictably, the federal courts have disagreed about when to
require tribal exhaustion. Several major areas of disagreement
involving both substantive and procedural questions have resulted.
For instance, in several cases, federal courts have stated that the
exhaustion rule applies only when a tribal judicial proceeding was
pending at the time the federal lawsuit was filed;"3 others have
concluded that the existence of ongoing tribal proceedings is
immaterial and have ordered exhaustion when no tribal suit was
pending." 4  Still other courts have avoided application of the
exhaustion doctrine by holding it inapplicable to preliminary jurisdic-
tional challenges such as whether the territory at issue remains within
Indian country"5 or whether the tribal government is properly
exercising sovereign powers."6 Regarding the type of subject matter
amenable to exhaustion, some courts limit the doctrine to "internal
tribal controvers[ies]; '' 7  others order exhaustion for disputes
despite the involvement of numerous off-reservation contacts and
interests."' In Stock West Corp. v. Taylor,"9 for example, the
113. See cases cited supra note 98.
114. Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
"[w]hether proceedings are actually pending in the appropriate tribal court is irrelevant"
to the federal courts' duty to require exhaustion of tribal court remedies (citation
omitted)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1144 (1992).
115. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387, 1422 (10th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1012 (1990). The Pittsburg & Midway Coal court remanded
the case to the district court to ascertain the extent to which the disputed lands were
located within Indian country. Id. The court distinguished National Farmers and Iowa
Mutual, concluding that those cases "did not extend to issues where reservation
boundaries, in contrast to subject-matter jurisdiction, were at issue, as is the case here."
Id. It should also be noted, however, that the tribe had not appealed the district court's
determination that exhaustion of tribal court remedies was not necessary. Id.
116. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
that the comity required by National Farmers and Iowa Mutual arises from a tribe's
sovereignty and that the federal district court is the proper forum for delineating the scope
of that retained sovereignty).
117. United States v. Turtle Mountain Hous. Auth., 816 F.2d 1273,1276 (8th Cir. 1987)
(ordering exhaustion in a trespass suit because the "facts tend to demonstrate that this is
a purely internal tribal controversy, which the tribal court is uniquely situated to resolve");
see also Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405,1407-08 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that
the exhaustion rule "does not apply when the dispute is not a 'reservation affair' and did
not 'arise on the reservation' " (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1174 (1992).
118. See, e.g., Bank of Okla. v. Muscogee Creek Nation, 972 F.2d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir.
1992) (dismissing interpleader filed by bank in a dispute between a tribe and a corporation
hired to manage tribal gaming activities and requiring exhaustion of tribal remedies
notwithstanding the bank's assertion that all banking activities took place off the
reservation); Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
exhaustion is required, despite the presence of off-reservation contacts, so long as "the
assertion of tribal court jurisdiction is plausible and appears to have a valid or genuine
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Ninth Circuit ordered exhaustion in a legal malpractice suit brought
by a non-Indian corporation against a non-Indian tribal attorney."2
The basis of the alleged malpractice was a letter written by the
attorney and delivered to the corporation at its Portland, Oregon
office.' The court concluded that tribal jurisdiction was at least
"colorable,"'" and hence required exhaustion under the National
Farmers rule. In this way, the court noted, the tribal court would
have an opportunity to determine "[w]hether Colville Tribal law
applies to a tort that involved certain acts committed on reservation
land and other acts committed outside its territorial jurisdiction.)'2 3
The holding provoked a sharp dissent, which accused the majority of
an unwarranted extension of the Supreme Court's exhaustion rule.24
In the dissent's view, the unnecessarily broad opinion would require
abstention upon the filing of any "[t]alismanic invocation of tribal
court jurisdiction."' Stock West clearly illustrates an unresolved
dilemma created by National Farmers: in its sketchy pronouncement
basis" (citation omitted)).
119. 964 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc), affg in part and vacating in part, 737 F.
Supp. 601 (D. Or. 1990).
120. Id. at 920.
121. Id. at 919-20.
122. Id. at 920.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 921-24 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 921. Undoubtedly, the dissent would have preferred to find an exception
to exhaustion in line with the Seventh Circuit's approach in Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux
Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 815 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 621 (1993). The Altheimer
& Grey court held that exhaustion was inappropriate in a contract dispute between a large
Chicago law firm and a manufacturing enterprise wholly owned by the tribe. Id. at 815.
While conceding that "[ilt is unclear as to how broadly Iowa Mutual and National Farmers
should be read," the court concluded that exhaustion was unnecessary, as "there has been
no direct attack on a tribal court's jurisdiction, there is no case pending in tribal court, and
the dispute does not concern a tribal ordinance as much as it does state and federal law."
Id. at 814. In addition, the court's decision was influenced by the Sioux manufacturing
corporation's contractual agreement to submit to the venue and jurisdiction of the courts
of Illinois. Id. at 815; see also Bull v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 15 F3d
1088, No. 92-35257, 1994 WL 6653, at *4 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 1994) (unpublished opinion)
(noting that a judicial order of tribal exhaustion "does not follow automatically from an
assertion of tribal court jurisdiction"). In contrast, one author recently endorsed a broad
interpretation of the exhaustion rule, concluding that "fidelity to the Supreme Court's
rulings and the principles governing relationships between Indian tribes and the federal
government requires federal courts to apply a clear rule of requiring exhaustion in all cases
except when an exception that the Supreme Court has set forth applies." Joranko, supra
note 9, at 261.
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of the exhaustion doctrine, the Court gave no hint of its intended scope.
National Farmers and Iowa Mutual also offer conflicting
suggestions about the applicability of the exhaustion rule when the
primary dispute involves an alleged violation of federal law.
Although the exhaustion rule was itself created to allow the tribal
court to rule on an issue of federal law (whether the tribal court had
jurisdiction over the dispute)," some courts nevertheless have held
that the federal court need not defer to the tribal court for resolution
of federal issues. In Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Blackfeet
Tribe,27 for example, a federal appellate court refused to require a
tribal adjudication of the plaintiff's challenge to the tribe's power to
tax its on-reservation right of way, noting that "[t]he complaint
presents issues of federal, not tribal, law."'"
In Blackfeet Tribe, the court articulated a principled difference
between challenges to the scope of a tribal court's adjudicatory power,
in which tribal exhaustion would be required, and disputes over a
tribe's sovereignty-based regulatory authority or legislative jurisdic-
tion, in which the court found exhaustion inappropriate. 29 That
126. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852
(1985) ("The question whether an Indian tribe retains the power to compel a non-Indian
property owner to submit to the civil jurisdiction of a tribal court is one that must be
answered by reference to federal law and is a 'federal question' under [28 U.S.C.] Sec.
1331.").
127. 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992).
128. Id. at 901 n.2. The Ninth Circuit, in a panel opinion later superseded by a
rehearing en banc, referred to Blackfeet Tribe as "something of an anomaly." Stock West
Corp. v. Taylor, 942 F.2d 655, 663 n.7 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd in part on rehearing, 964 F.2d
912 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
Other courts have expressed similar concerns about requiring exhaustion in cases
involving questions of federal law. In Duncan Energy v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the
Fort Berthold Reservation, 812 F. Supp. 1008 (D.N.D. 1992), rev'd, 27 F.3d 1294 (8th Cir.
1994), for instance, a federal district court concluded that exhaustion of tribal remedies was
not appropriate in a suit disputing the power of the tribe to impose a particular tax. Id.
at 1011-12. The court was unwilling to accept "the premise that only the tribal court has
the power to determine the extent of the power of the tribal government," especially since
"this is not a case where tribal jurisdiction is challenged, but a case where the power of
the tribe to excise a severance tax is challenged." id. Concurring in the judgment of the
Eighth Circuit to reverse the district court's opinion, Judge Loken expressed considerable
hesitation about applying exhaustion to the facts of this case. Duncan Energy, 27 F.3d at
1301-03 (Loken, ., concurring); see also Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d
803, 814 (7th Cir.) (noting, as one of several factors arguing against exhaustion, that "the
dispute does not concern a tribal ordinance as much as it does state and federal law"), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 621 (1993); Myrick v. Devils Lake Sioux Mfg. Corp., 718 F. Supp. 753,
755 (D.N.D. 1989) ("The federal claims which form the basis of this lawsuit are properly
heard in the federal court.").
129. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d at 901 n.2.
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difference, however, is not suggested by the Supreme Court's
analysis 3' and in fact was implicitly rejected by the Court's reversal
of the Ninth Circuit's National Farmers opinion, which had premised
its holding on that distinction.' Nevertheless, for some courts at
least, the distinction between legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction
provides a more satisfactory accommodation of tribal sovereign
interests and the federal courts' duty to exercise jurisdiction in cases
presenting federal questions. 32  In a similar vein, some courts have
avoided tribal exhaustion by holding that it did not apply when the
court independently concluded that the tribal court had no jurisdiction
over the dispute3 3 or when the court found that the tribal ordinance
was preempted by federal law." On their face, these cases seem
130. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 853-56
(1985). Rather than base its decision upon categorical distinctions, the Court took care
to demonstrate that the propriety of exhaustion hinges upon the facts of a particular case.
Id. at 855-56. As an illustration, the Court compared the facts underlying its earlier
Oliphant decision, in which it denied the tribal courts criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians, see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978), with those
present in the matter before it. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 853-55. The Court refused
to apply the reasoning of Oliphant, stating that,
although Congress's decision to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the federal
courts to offenses committed by non-Indians against Indians within Indian
Country supported the holding in Oliphant, there is no comparable legislation
granting the federal courts jurisdiction over civil disputes between Indians and
non-Indians that arise on an Indian reservation.
Id. at 854. The Court went on to describe the proper approach to deciding whether tribal
court jurisdiction is proper in the first instance:
[T]he existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require a careful
examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been
altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes,
Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administra-
tive or judicial decisions.
Id. at 855-56 (footnotes omitted).
131. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320,
1323 (1984).
132. See, e.g., Burlington N.R.R. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899, 901 n.2 (9th Cir.
1991) (en bane), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992); Blue Legs v. United States Bureau
of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1989) (interpreting the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 as conferring exclusive jurisdiction on federal
courts). Similarly, the Seventh Circuit refused to order exhaustion in a dispute involving
on-reservation entities, in part because "the dispute does not concern a tribal ordinance
as much as it does state and federal law." Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983
F.2d 803, 814 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 621 (1993).
133. United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 861 (9th Cir. 1986)
('[E]xhaustion... [was] pointless because tribal court jurisdiction clearly was foreclosed
by the sovereign immunity of the United States." (citation omitted)).
134. Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian
Community, 991 F.2d 458, 463 (8th Cir. 1993) ("The only remedies are those created in
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flatly inconsistent with National Farmers's directive that exhaustion is
necessary to allow the tribal court to determine the scope of its own
jurisdiction.'35
In direct contrast, other courts have required exhaustion in nearly
identical situations. In Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Crow
Tribal Council,136 for instance, the Ninth Circuit ordered the plaintiff
railroad to tribal court to challenge the applicability of the tribe's
Common Carrier Ordinance to the railroad's lines passing through the
reservation. 37 Similarly, in a challenge to a tribe's sovereign power
to enforce a conservation ordinance on lands owned by non-Indians
within the borders of the reservation, a Montana district court
required exhaustion of tribal remedies.' In the "first major tribal
tax case to be heard by a tribal court,""'  a federal district judge
refused to exercise jurisdiction over a case filed by several oil
companies to challenge the applicability of a tribal severance tax to
their operations on land held in trust for tribal members.4
the [Tribal] ordinance itself, and those remedies are void by virtue of the ordinance's
preemption [by the federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Act]. This leaves
[Northern States Power Co.] with nothing to exhaust.").
135. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57
(1985). The Court noted:
Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-
determination. That policy favors a rule that will provide the forum whose
jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and
legal bases for the challenge.... The risks of... "procedural nightmare[s]"..
. will be minimized if the federal court stays its hand until after the Tribal Court
has had a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction ....
Id. at 856-57 (citation omitted).
136. 940 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1991).
137. Id. at 1247. Among other things, the ordinance created a tribal regulatory
commission to ensure that the railroad provided "regular service" and "sufficient...
freight and passenger facilities" on the reservation and to prevent the discontinuation of
existing railroad service without the commission's approval. Id. at 1241.
138. Middlemist v. Secretary of the U.S. Dep't of Interior, 824 F. Supp. 940, 947 (D.
Mont. 1993), affd, 19 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1994). Similarly, in Kaul v. Wahquahboshkuk,
838 F. Supp. 515, 518 (D. Kan. 1993), the judge ordered tribal exhaustion for a non-Indian
plaintiff challenging the tribe's sovereign authority over her on-reservation business.
139. NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 8 [hereinafter NARF
1993 ANNUAL REPORT] (referring to Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Cheyenne Arapaho Tax
Comm'n, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6095 (Cheyenne-
Arapahoe Dist. Ct., Jan. 31, 1991)).
140. Although the Oklahoma district court order is unpublished, the Native American
Rights Fund, representing the tribe in this case, described the procedural history of the
case in its annual report. Id. In 1991, the Cheyenne Arapaho Tribal Court granted
summary judgment in favor of the tribe, Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Cheyenne Arapaho Tax
Commission, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6095, 6096
(Cheyenne-Arapaho Dist. Ct., Jan. 31, 1991). The Tribal Supreme Court has heard
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The remarkable imprecision of the Supreme Court's announ-
cement that exhaustion of tribal remedies would be required "in a
case of this kind"'4' has failed to provide adequate direction on
these crucial questions involving the scope of tribal court power.' 42
Taken individually, each case presents a defensible stance about the
proper accommodation of tribal and federal court power. Viewed
together, however, the cases produce uneven and inconsistent
applications of what is itself an uncertain principle.
2. The Scope of Post-Exhaustion Review
In both National Farmers and Iowa Mutual, the Supreme Court
referred approvingly to post-exhaustion federal court review of the
tribal court decision. The two holdings, however, cast the issue
somewhat differently. The National Farmers Court suggested broad
federal review by emphasizing the value of tribal adjudication and the
development of a full tribal court record "before either the merits or
any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed [by the federal
arguments in the oil companies' appeal. NARF 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 138,
at 8. It bears noting that the tribal trial court cited exclusively federal cases in its opinion.
Similarly, in Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294,1300-01 (8th Cir. 1994), the Eighth Circuit recently reversed the
district court's refusal to order tribal exhaustion in a challenge to a tribal tax and to a
tribal employment preference ordinance.
141. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855
(1985).
142. See KENNE=H CuL' DAvIs & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMINIsTRATIVE LAw
TREATISE § 15.2 (3d ed. 1994) for a discussion of challenges to agency jurisdiction in the
context of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Davis treatise details the full extent
of judicial inconsistency, noting that "the Court's opinions on exhaustion do not form a
consistent and coherent pattern," and describing the opinions as "difficult to reconcile."
Id. at 312. The treatise proposes that a court consider four factors to guide its decision to
order exhaustion of administrative remedies:
(1) the extent of injury to petitioner from requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies, (2) the degree of difficulty of merits issue the court is asked to resolve,
(3) the extent to which judicial resolution of merits issue will be aided by agency
factfinding or application of expertise, and (4) the extent to which the agency has
already completed its factfinding or applied its expertise.
Id. at 315. Some of the lower court tribal exhaustion holdings discussed above actually
suggest reasoning similar to the Davis proposal. Several Supreme Court cases have, in one
manner or another, similarly avoided the tribal exhaustion rule. See, e.g., Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 425-26 (1989)
(noting that whereas a tribe's inherent sovereignty ordinarily grants its tribal courts
jurisdiction to hear matters arising on the reservation, this "sovereignty, however, is
divested to the extent it is inconsistent with the tribe's dependent status, that is, to the
extent it involves a tribe's 'external relations' " (citations omitted)).
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court]."'' For the National Farmers Court, then, some type of post-
exhaustion review on the merits is clearly contemplated." 4  The
potential breadth of that suggested review becomes clearer, however,
when placed in the context of the factual dispute at issue in the case.
Because the sole federal question in National Farmers was whether
the tribal court had adjudicatory jurisdiction to hear the underlying
personal injury lawsuit, the Court's reference to subsequent review
"on the merits" suggests that the jurisdictional bootstrap may open up
the entire tribal court resolution of the underlying negligence suit to
federal court review. If that was the Supreme Court's intended result,
the Court's repeated emphasis of its commitment to tribal sovereignty
as a basis for the exhaustion doctrine seems disingenuous at best.
In contrast, the Court's subsequent Iowa Mutual opinion suggests
that at least some part of the tribal proceedings Will have a preclusive
effect in subsequent federal court cases: "Unless a federal court
determines that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction, . . . proper
deference to the tribal court system precludes relitigation of issues
raised by the [insurance law dispute] and resolved in the Tribal
Courts."' 4 Even though the Iowa Mutual Court appears to require
substantially more deference to the tribal court proceedings than the
National Farmers opinion would mandate,46 the Court did not
define clearly the range of issues entitled to post-exhaustion
preclusion; nor did the Iowa Mutual Court recognize any inconsisten-
cy with its earlier endorsement in National Farmers of full federal
court post-exhaustion review.
Given these uncertain and somewhat contradictory statements
about the scope of post-exhaustion review, inconsistency among the
lower federal courts was to be expected for this aspect of the tribal
exhaustion rule as well. Considering the courts' general and strongly
held commitment to the fullest exercise possible of adjudicatory
jurisdiction,47 it is not surprising that many courts have focused on
143. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856.
144. The possible preclusive effect of tribal court decisions is unclear. As one
commentator suggested, it will be "great weight, no weight at all, or something in
between." Laurence, Enforcement of Judgments, supra note 32, at 646.
145. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987).
146. See id. at 21-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813
(1976) ("Abstention from the exercise of Federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the
rule."); see also Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The mere fact that
a case involving the same issue is pending in another court has never been considered a
sufficient reason to excuse a federal court from performing its duty 'to adjudicate a
controversy properly before it.' " (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co.,
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National Farmers's reference to post-exhaustion review on the merits
rather than on Iowa Mutual's deferential statements about the
preclusive effect of tribal court adjudication.' The cases suggest
that a court's willingness to order exhaustion of tribal remedies often
hinges upon its interpretation of the permissible scope of subsequent
federal court review. That is, those courts that order exhaustion in
the broadest range of circumstances are also those that stress the
availability of comprehensive federal court review on the merits.'49
For these courts, the tribal court becomes something akin to a
nonbinding factfinder. One court observed that
[efficiency concerns] also compel exhaustion of tribal
remedies before [the plaintiff] resorts to federal district
court. Here the Tribe itself is in the best position to develop
the necessary factual record for disposition on the merits.
Without that tribal record, the federal district court here
faced an action based on an uninterpreted tribal ordinance
and an obscure factual background. 0
Similarly, other courts describe the exhaustion doctrine as giving tribal
courts the "first crack"'' or the "first opportunity"'52 to evaluate
the factual and legal claims, 3 clearly implying that a "second crack"
or "second opportunity" will be made available to the litigants.
To date, only a handful of post-exhaustion challenges have
actually been filed in federal court. It is at precisely this point, of
360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959))).
148. See, e.g., Burlington N.R.R. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 1246 (9th Cir.
1991) (quoting the expansive federal court review language of National Farmers).
149. In Burlington N.R.R. v. Crow Tribal Council, for example, the court began with
a broad statement of the exhaustion doctrine: "[NIon-Indian defendants must exhaust
tribal court remedies before seeking relief in federal court, even where defendants allege
that proceedings in tribal court exceed tribal sovereign jurisdiction." Id. at 1244. The
court then reiterated National Farmers's language suggesting expansive federal court
review. Id. at 1246; see also Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 798 F.2d 1324, 1328-29
(10th Cir. 1986) (holding that the federal district court is empowered to review a tribal
court decision).
150. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d at 1246.
151. Tom's Amusement Co. v. Cuthbertson, 816 F. Supp. 403, 406 (W.D.N.C. 1993)
(quoting Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 942 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1991)).
152. Superior Oil Co., 798 F.2d at 1329 (ordering tribal exhaustion in suit alleging that
a tribe's cancellation of lease violated federal law; the court noted that "[tihe policy of
exhaustion would afford the tribal court the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and
legal bases for the challenge" (emphasis added)).
153. Stock West Corp., 964 F.2d 920 (stating that whether the challenged statute
.'protects Mr. Taylor, who is a non-Indian, from suit for his work as counsel for two tribal
corporations is a matter that requires an interpretation of legislative intent that should be
conducted in the first instance by the... tribal courts"); Superior Oil, 798 F.2d at 1329.
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course, that the courts' vague pre-exhaustion statements about the
scope of post-exhaustion review acquires heightened significance. For
federal courts trying to implement the Supreme Court's cryptic
references to post-exhaustion review, two significant uncertainties
always will arise: first, to what types of issues does the Iowa Mutual
Court's concept of "proper deference" accord tribal court decisions a
preclusive effect? And second, what level of review should apply to
those tribal court findings for which post-exhaustion review is
permissible?
Careful reading of the Supreme Court opinions suggests few
guidelines. The Iowa Mutual Court's reference to the preclusive
effect of the tribal court's decision encompassed only the resolution
of the underlying allegation that the insurance company had acted in
bad faith in refusing to settle the plaintiff's personal injury claim.
Presumably, if the federal court concluded that the tribal court
properly exercised adjudicatory jurisdiction over the case, it could not
disagree with the tribal court's conclusion that the insurance company
did or did not act in bad faith. At a minimum, then, the Supreme
Court suggests that tribal courts' factual determinations and ap-
plications of tribal law to private disputes are binding on the federal
courts. But what about the determination that a fee owner of land
within the borders of a reservation is subject to the tribe's shoreline
protection ordinance?" Or a holding that a tribe's cancellation of
a lease did or did not violate federal law?155 Or perhaps a decision
that determines whether a tribal tax can be assessed on oil and gas
activities on land allotted to individual Indians within the borders of
the reservation?156 Although the Court provided few hints about
when "proper deference to the tribal court system"" 7 precludes
federal relitigation of an issue, it seems inconceivable that the Court
contemplated that a tribal court's interpretation of "the outer
boundaries of an Indian tribe's power over non-Indians" '58 would
154. See Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation v. Namen,
665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982).
155. See Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 798 F.2d 1324, 1329 (10th Cir. 1986)
(ordering exhaustion of tribal remedies for resolution of the allegation).
156. Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Cheyenne Arapaho Tax Comm'n, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am.
Indian Law. Training Program) 6095, 6095 (Cheyenne-Arapaho Dist. Ct. 1991).
157. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987).
158. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851
(1985).
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be unreviewable. 5 9
In practice, the few cases involving post-exhaustion review
demonstrate that the lower courts may be even less willing than the
Supreme Court to attach a preclusive effect to the tribal court ruling.
In Little Horn State Bank v. Crow Tribal Court,'"' the federal
district court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the enfor-
cement of a tribal court order,'6 ' noting that the tribal court's
"blatantly arbitrary denial of any semblance of due process"'62 had
made it "extremely difficult" to follow the Supreme Court's exhaus-
tion policy.'63 Although this case predates the Supreme Court's
exhaustion rule and stands alone in its disparaging analogy of tribal
court proceedings to a "kangaroo court,"'1' other federal courts
have expressed a similar uneasiness and unwillingness to refrain from
active review of tribal court proceedings.' 65
In FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes166 the Ninth Circuit was
the first federal appellate court to articulate legal standards for post-
exhaustion review." In that case, a non-Indian business operating
159. Id. at 851-53. In the context of parallel state and federal court proceedings,
Supreme Court decisions clearly establish that "matters litigated and decided in state court
cannot be relitigated in federal court because of collateral estoppel." ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION 440 (1989) (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90
(1980)). Professor Chemerinsky criticized the breadth of Allen, because'the state court
defendant in that case had not chosen the state forum and had no ability to remove the
case to federal court. Id. at 438-39. The Court's language in the tribal exhaustion cases,
which in fact anticipated subsequent lower federal court review of tribal court decisions,
suggested a quite different judicial attitude about the preclusive effect of tribal court
determinations.
160. 690 F. Supp. 919 (D. Mont. 1988).
161. Id. at 920.
162. Id. at 923.
163. Id.
164. Id.; see Laurence, Enforcement of Judgments, supra note 32, at 590-609 (comparing
Little Horn with similar cases involving jurisdictional questions); Williams, Documents of
Barbarism, supra note 45, at 274-75 (criticizing the dominant white society's "totalizing
strategy for dealing with tribalism's perceived difference in protecting the rights of those
under its jurisdiction" by establishing generalizations about tribal courts as "kangaroo
courts" from one isolated incident).
165. See, e.g., Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294, 1301-03 (8th Cir. 1994) (Loken, J., concurring) (agreeing that
Supreme Court precedent requires a ruling of exhaustion but questioning the wisdom of
that result); Espil v. Sells, 847 F. Supp. 752, 755-60 (D.Ariz. 1994) (ordering defendants to
exhaust remedies in the Navajo Supreme Court but expressing confusion over the tribal
court's conclusions); Tom's Amusement Co. v. Cuthbertson, 816 F. Supp. 403, 407
(W.D.N.C. 1993) (conditioning its order of tribal exhaustion on tribal court compliance
with conditions specified by federal district court).
166. 905 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 943 (1991).
167. Id. at 1313.
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on land owned in fee within the borders of a reservation challenged
the applicability of the tribe's Employment Rights Ordinance to its
operations." s Under this ordinance, all employers are required to
apply a hiring preference to Native Americans living on the reser-
vation. 69 The Tribal Appellate Court had affirmed the trial court's
order upholding the tribe's jurisdiction to enforce the regulation. 7
Dissatisfied with the outcome, the non-Indian corporation sought
relief in federal court. The Ninth Circuit, reversing the district court's
holding that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the
ordinance, 71 remanded the case to the tribal court for resolution of
the plaintiff's contention that the ordinance was invalid under the
Indian Civil Rights Act.'72 More interesting than its disposition of
the merits, perhaps, was the court's announcement of the standards
of review applicable to post-exhaustion proceedings in federal
court. 73 According to the Ninth Circuit panel, the tribal court's
factual determinations should be reviewed on a "clearly erroneous
standard," while federal legal questions are to be reviewed de
novo.'74 The court did not mention what, if any, standard of review
is applicable to tribal court application and interpretation of tribal and
state law.' 5
All in all, the scope of post-exhaustion federal court review is
extremely uncertain. Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged
the need for deference to tribal court decisions,176 the limited
168. Id. at 1312.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1315. The district court had "reversed" the tribal court, using an
"independent review" standard. Id. at 1313. However, as one concurring judge has noted
in another exhaustion case, the procedural basis for this course of action is by no means
obvious. Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Bort Berthold Reservation,
27 F.3d 1294 1301-03 (8th Cir. 1994) (Loken, J., concurring). No federal statute currently
authorizes federal district court jurisdiction to review tribal court opinions. See Duncan
Energy, id. at 1302 (Loken, J., concurring).
172. FMC, 905 F.2d at 1315. Under the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, federal court review of tribal court application of the Indian Civil Rights Act
in civil matters is not available. 436 U.S. 49, 70 (1978). Presumably, those issues will be
beyond the scope of post-exhaustion federal court review.
173. FMC, 905 F.2d at 1313.
174. Id. The Eighth Circuit recently approved of that legal standard for post-
exhaustion review. Duncan Energy, 27 F.3d at 1300.
175. The Supreme Court of North Dakota has suggested that tribal determinations on
issues of tribal law are not open to review in subsequent state court proceedings.
Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, Mercury, Lincoln, Inc., 462 N.W.2d 164, 169 (N.D.
1990).
176. See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987).
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context in which the statement was made, coupled with the lower
federal courts' unwillingness to limit federal review,1 17 suggests that
relitigation of issues already decided in tribal courts will be the rule
rather than the exception. Moreover, the one federal court of appeals
to articulate standards of review for tribal court proceedings suggested
that even factual determinations made by a tribal court fall within the
scope of federal court jurisdiction in a post-exhaustion lawsuit.'78
3. The Exceptions to Exhaustion-Footnote 21
As if the vagueness of the tribal exhaustion rule were not
enough, the National Farmers Court qualified its holding in the
decision's twenty-first footnote, reminding the lower courts that
[w]e do not suggest that exhaustion would be required where
an assertion of tribal jurisdiction "is motivated by a desire to
harass or is conducted in bad faith," or where the action is
patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or
where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an
adequate opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdic-
tion.179
These stated objections, drawn broadly from the rule of exhaustion of
administrative remedies,'" were clarified slightly in Iowa Mutual
when the Court stated that the "alleged incompetence of tribal
courts" does not fall within one of the exceptions to tribal exhaus-
tion.181
Perhaps because many courts have found alternative ways to
avoid the exhaustion requirement,1 footnote twenty-one's excep-
tions have not received widespread attention from the lower federal
courts. And, unfortunately, those cases that do rely on the exceptions
frequently misunderstand their scope. In Superior Oil Co. v. United
177. See, e.g., FMC, 905 F.2d at 1313; Tom's Amusement Co. v. Cuthbertson, 816 F.
Supp. 403, 407 (W.D.N.C. 1993).
178. FMC, 905 F.2d at 1313. In a recent article on the tribal exhaustion doctrine the
author argues that tribal court interpretations of tribal law should be binding on federal
court, with de novo federal court review of federal law questions. Joranko, supra note 9,
at 297. With respect to tribal court findings of fact, the author argues that the FMC
court's clearly erroneous standard is inappropriately intrusive on tribal sovereignty. Id. at
299-306. Instead, he suggests, the Supreme Court's general rules of issue preclusion should
apply to tribal court decisions as well. Id. at 302.
179. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,857 n.21
(1985) (citation omitted).
180. See DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 142, § 15 for general discussion and description
of the rule of exhaustion of state administrative remedies.
181. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987).
182. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
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States,"s for example, the Tenth Circuit suggested that if the plain-
tiff could prove on remand that the tribal council's interpretation of
the plaintiff's leases was made in bad faith, the bad faith exception
would remove the case from the scope of the exhaustion doctrine.' 84
Although National Farmers's footnote twenty-one does not specify
whose bad faith is relevant, a logical reading suggests that the Court
is concerned with bad faith on the part of the tribal court, not the
tribal council. 85 If the bad faith exception can be read to encom-
pass allegations of bad faith on the part of a litigant, the tribal court
will thereby be deprived of jurisdiction over the very conduct it would
otherwise be asked to prohibit or sanction.'86 Surely the Court did
183. 798 F.2d 1324, 1329 (10th Cir. 1986).
184. Id. at 1331.
185. In some instances those two bodies are one and the same. For example, the
Constitution of the Santa Clara Pueblo tribe vests judicial authority in the tribal council.
See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66 n.22 (1978). Thus, Julia Martinez,
by virtue of being denied a federal forum, was effectively denied all meaningful review of
her claim because the tribal council that passed the ordinance was unlikely to find itself
in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act. See id. at 80 (White, J., dissenting). If the
tribal council and the tribal judiciary are the same body, the bad faith exception should
apply if the tribal council evidences bad faith in asserting jurisdiction. It is precisely in
such a case that a litigant needs the protection of a federal forum. However, in Superior
Oil, a case involving the Navajo Nation, the tribal council and the tribal court were two
separate entities. See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, BRANCH OF JUDICIAL SERVICES,
NATIVE AMERicAN TRIBAL COURT PROFILES 62 (1985). In that case, the bad faith of the
tribal legislative officials should not have had any bearing on the application of the
exhaustion doctrine.
186. For example, in Little Horn State Bank v. Crow Tribal Court, 690 F. Supp. 919 (D.
Mont. 1988), the plaintiff bank sued the tribal court alleging violation of its due process
rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act. Id. at 921. Prior to its Indian Civil Rights Act
lawsuit, the bank had sought enforcement of a state court default judgment in Crow Tribal
Court. Id. at 923. After waiting for a tribal court decision for two years, plaintiff
exercised self-help and repossessed a forklift from the Native American defendants. Id.
at 920-21. Shortly afterwards, the tribal court ordered the bank to return the forklift; the
Native American defendants sought state court enforcement of that tribal court order. Id.
at 921. Despite the bank's attempts to be heard, the presiding tribal judge allegedly
refused to hold a hearing or accept motions. Id. The federal district court, agreeing with
the bank's allegation that the tribal court's actions were illegal, issued a permanent
injunction prohibiting the Crow Tribal Court from enforcing its order. Id. at 920.
Although the district court opinion found that Little Horn Bank had exhausted its tribal
remedies, the bank's allegations, if true, appear sufficient to establish bad faith by a tribal
tribunal asserting jurisdiction. Id. at 923-24. Of course, a showing of bad faith would not
render a federal injunction of a tribal court any less problematic in terms of tribal
sovereignty. Id. at 923. In a similar case, A & A Concrete, Inc. v. White Mountain
Apache Tribe, 781 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit suggested that if the
appellants had proved that the tribal court's assertion of jurisdiction was made in bad faith,
the federal district court would have been able to enjoin the tribe from enforcing its
default judgment. Id. at 1417.
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not mean to give the litigants themselves the p ower to determine the
scope of the exhaustion rule.' 7
Similarly, although the exception for actions "patently violative
of express jurisdictional prohibitions" seems more straightforward, the
Court does not clarify whose jurisdictional provisions are relevant.
Does the Court mean that exhaustion is not required when the tribal
jurisdictional code clearly does not allow the tribal court to exercise
jurisdiction, or should the inquiry focus on whether the tribal court's
assertion of jurisdiction would patently violate federal limits on tribal
jurisdiction? The Eighth Circuit in DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal
Courtlrs suggested that the former inquiry is the intended meaning
of the exception. 9 In its view, the federal court should analyze
tribal law to determine whether tribal court jurisdiction is clearly
prohibited."9 Removing from the tribal court the power to deter-
mine whether its code establishes jurisdiction in a particular
proceeding, however, runs counter to the Court's observation that the
exhaustion doctrine allows tribal courts to provide the "benefit of
187. The same misunderstanding exists with regard to the futility exception. In
Superior Oil the court assumed that if the Navajo Tribe and individual tribal officials acted
in bad faith in withholding consent of assignments of leases and requests for seismic
permits, exhaustion of tribal court remedies would be futile within the meaning of footnote
21's exception. Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 798 F.2d 1324, 1331 (10th Cir. 1986).
This assumption seems unduly cynical when applied to the Navajo Nation's sophisticated
tribal justice system, where an independent judiciary enjoys lifetime tenure. Further, the
logic of the National Farmers decision, focusing as it does on the importance of allowing
a tribal forum to ascertain the scope of its retained sovereignty in the first instance, argues
against expanding the footnote 21 exceptions any more than necessary to preserve scarce
judicial resources. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471
U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985)
188. 874 F.2d 510, 516-17 (8th Cir. 1989).
189. Id. at 516-17.
190. In DeMent, a nonmember of the tribe sought a federal writ of habeas corpus to
regain custody of his children, who were residing on the reservation with their mother
under a tribal court award of custody. Id. at 512. Both DeMent and the Eighth Circuit
assumed that the "express jurisdictional prohibition" language of footnote 21 referred to
tribal law. DeMent argued that, under Article V of the Oglala Sioux Constitution, the
tribal court's jurisdiction extended only to members and to nonmembers who consented
to its jurisdiction. Id. at 516. The tribe argued that § 48 of the tribal code, giving tribal
court jurisdiction over child custody disputes in divorce proceedings, expanded its
jurisdictional authority. Id. at 517. The Eighth Circuit concluded that, under the facts of
the case, there was no patent violation of express jurisdictional provisions, and thus the
district court had erred in hearing the case. Id. at 516. The court reasoned that, because
DeMent had entered the reservation on three separate occasions intending to remove the
children and had participated in a custody hearing in a tribal court, it was far from clear
that DeMent had not consented to jurisdiction within the meaning of Article V of the
tribal constitution. Id. at 516-17. The court further took note of the possible application
of § 48 of the tribal code to the jurisdictional question. Id.
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their expertise"'91 to the federal court. Surely the interpretation of
the tribal code ought to remain within the province of the tribal court;
a preferable reading of the "patently violative" exception would
construe those words as applying to patent federal law restrictions on
the tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction."9
Undoubtedly, footnote twenty-one's exceptions were intended to
provide the lower courts some flexibility to refuse to order exhaustion
in narrowly limited circumstances." a  Nevertheless, the courts'
apparent misunderstanding of the scope of these exceptions casts
further doubt on the workability of the exhaustion rule itself.
4. Conflicting Presumptions of Jurisdiction
Although the Supreme Court did not provide significant detail
regarding the scope of its tribal exhaustion rule in National Farmers
or Iowa Mutual, the two opinions describe the reach of tribal
sovereignty from a strong pro-tribal perspective. In one such passage,
the Court even suggested a presumption of tribal jurisdiction: "Civil
jurisdiction over [the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands]
presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by
a specific treaty provision or federal statute." '194
When viewed in the context of recent Supreme Court holdings in
federal Indian law, that sentence stands in stark contrast to language
in the Court's important decision in Montana v. United States,195 in
which the Court denied the tribe's ability to regulate the hunting and
fishing activities of nonmembers within the borders of the reservation
on land owned in fee by nonmembers.19 6 In that case, the Court's
191. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857.
192. For example, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), the
Supreme Court held that retained tribal sovereignty does not extend to the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers. Id. at 212. The Court found that not only did
early treaty provisions assume that the tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians absent the permission of Congress, but that, historically, "Congress consistently
believed this to be the necessary result of its repeated legislative actions." Id. at 204.
Because federal law had clearly divested tribes of jurisdiction over nonmembers, the tribe's
exercise of jurisdiction was "patently violative" of federal jurisdictional prohibitions. Id.
at 211-12.
193. Similar exceptions to the general rule of exhaustion of state administrative
remedies have likewise produced a large body of inconsistent and confusing case law. See
generally DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 142, §§ 15.5-15.7 (discussing exceptions to
exhaustion rule such as the constitutional right exception, waiver exeption, and other
"unacknowledged" exceptions).
194. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
195. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
196. Id. at 564-67.
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presumption was quite different: the Court reviewed case precedent
and noted "the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of
the tribe.""'
Reconciling these apparently conflicting presumptions about
tribal sovereignty is not necessarily difficult; quite simply, the National
Farmers presumption might be construed as applying to the scope of
tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction-that is, the power of the tribal
court to adjudicate the controversy before it. The Montana Court's
opinion, in contrast, could be described as focusing on the scope of
the tribe's regulatory control or legislative jurisdiction over nonmem-
bers. For whatever reason, though, the Supreme Court implicitly
rejected the neat distinction made by the Ninth Circuit in its National
Farmers opinion. 9 Instead, the Court positioned National Farmers
197. Id. at 565. With what are commonly called the Montana exceptions, the Court did
recognize the inherent power of tribes to "regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribes or
its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements" ("the
first exception") and to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians even on
fee lands within the reservation when that conduct "threatens or has some direct effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe" ("the
second exception"). Id. at 565-66.
Although these two exceptions appeared to leave ample room for continued
affirmation of retained tribal sovereignty, the Court soon put to rest the hope that it would
interpret those exceptions generously. In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 432 (1989), the Court refused to allow the tribe to
exercise zoning powers over non-Indians who owned land within portions of the
reservation open to the public. The Court indicated that the second Montana exception
"should not be understood to vest zoning authority in the tribe." Id. at 430 (opinion of
White, J.). Rather, the court concluded that any significant tribal interest in activities
taking place on fee land within the reservation would be entitled to protection under the
Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution. Id. at 431 (opinion of White, J.).
198. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320, 1322
n.3 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
In fact, the Court's lack of clarity in distinguishing legislative jurisdiction from
adjudicatory or subject matter jurisdiction is not unique to federal Indian law. In EEOC
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), for instance, the plaintiff alleged employment
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, basing his complaint on actions that
allegedly occurred while he was an overseas employee of an American corporation. Id.
at 246-47. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, holding that Congress did not intend to extend the protection
of Title VII beyond the territorial borders of the United States. Id. at 255-59.
As one of the authors of a preeminent casebook on the conflict of laws has noted,
surely the Supreme Court was wrong in its decision that the federal court had no subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit. The Court had actually concluded that because
Title VII only protects individuals employed in the United States, the plaintiff had not pled
"an essential element of a Title VII claim." LARRY KRAMER, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO
ACCOMPANY CONFLICr OF LAWS, CASEs-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 246 (5th ed. 1993).
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within the broader dispute over the scope of tribal power over non-
Indians by distinguishing it from a recent case in which the Court had
refused to allow tribal courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians.1" Thus, by obfuscating the debate over the scope of
tribal sovereign powers over nonmembers, the exhaustion doctrine has
created yet another uncertainty.2°
5. The "No Forum Problem" 20 1
Although the "no forum problem" is not a creature of the
exhaustion doctrine, it creates a complication left unaddressed by
National Farmers and Iowa Mutual. The problem exists, for example,
when a tribal ordinance fails to extend jurisdiction over the parties or
over the cause of action that has come to federal court for relief,202
Thus, "[t]he proper disposition should have been to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted." Id.
199. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 854 (distinguishing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)). In Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), the Oliphant principle
was extended to nonmember Indians. The Duro Court held that an Indian tribe may not
assert criminal jurisdiction over an Indian who is not a tribe member. Id. at 679.
200. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989). In that case, the Yakima Nation argued that the presumption of retained
tribal sovereignty articulated in National Farmers and Iowa Mutual supported a broad gloss
on tribal regulatory power. Id. at 422-23 (opinion of White, J.). The Court found the
presumption inapplicable, stating that those cases had addressed only the question of tribal
judicial jurisdiction, not tribal regulatory jurisdiction. Id. at 427 n.10 (opinion of White,
J.). However, that limitation is not at all clear from the cases themselves. In National
Farmers, for instance, the Court cited United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978),
for the proposition that "Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not
withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependant
status." National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 852 n.14. Similarly, in Iowa Mutual, the Court cited
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 n.14 (1982), as support for its
assertion that "[b]ecause the Tribe retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have
not been divested by the Federal Government, the proper inference from silence... is
that the sovereign power.., remains intact." Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9,
18 (1987).
201. See Pommersheim, Crucible of Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 347 (arguing that the
"no forum" problem exists when a tribal court determines that "it does not have
jurisdiction-judicial or legislative-and accordingly dismisses the case before it and where
there is also no basis for state or federal jurisdiction").
202. For example, in Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974), a non-
Indian plaintiff was faced with a tribal jurisdictional statute that required plaintiffs to be
"resident or doing business on the Reservation for at least one year prior to the institution
of the proceeding." Id. at 69 (citing Code of Justice of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, §
1.2(c) (July 1973)). The Eighth Circuit opinion declined to find federal or state subject
matter jurisdiction over the controversy, leaving the plaintiffs without a forum. Id. at 69-
70. The tribal code also limited the tribal court's subject matter jurisdiction over such suits
to those in which the amount in controversy did not exceed $300.00. Id. at 69 n.2.
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or, in more extreme cases, when no tribal court system exists.20 3
Presumably, a court would not apply the tribal exhaustion doctrine to
send the parties to a nonexistent forum; but by the same token, it is
unclear that the absence of a tribal forum should be sufficient to
create federal jurisdiction.
In essence, the exhaustion doctrine introduces to the federal
courts a problem familiar to state and tribal courts involved in
delineating the proper spheres of their respective jurisdiction. In the
aftermath of Williams v. Lee,2' state courts wrestled with the "no
forum" problem when deciding whether to uphold the assertion of
state court subject matter jurisdiction. Some courts found that the
absence of a tribal remedy or a tribal forum automatically gives rise
to state court jurisdiction;2 ' others concluded that the principles of
Professor Pommersheim has described similar jurisdictional provisions in other tribal
ordinances. Pommersheim, Crucible of Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 338-39 nn.63-68. The
Rosebud Sioux Tribal Code, for instance, bars all claims for declaratory relief. Id. at 338
n.64. Prior to a 1986 amendment, the Rosebud code foreclosed personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants. Id. at 338 n.65. The Oglala Sioux Tribal Constitution limits its
judicial powers to cases involving tribal members "arising under the constitution, bylaws,
or ordinances of the Tribe and to other cases in which all parties consent to jurisdiction."
Id. at 339 n.68. Professor Pommersheim observed that tribal constitutional provisions
evincing caution regarding tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians likely "reflect the drafting
handiwork of the Bureau of Indian Affairs" but that this approach is "clearly at odds with
the current trend toward meaningful self-determination and the support for tribal court
authority" reflected in National Farmers and Iowa Mutual. Id. at 339.
203. See, e.g., Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1475 n.11 (9th Cir.
1989). In Chilkat, the Village had no tribal courts when it initiated the suit. By the time
the Ninth Circuit heard the case, the Chilkat Village Council had authorized a tribal court
system, but there was some question as to whether "those courts are actually organized
and able to entertain cases." Id. As a result, the court decided to enforce the tribal
ordinance itself. Id. at 1475-76: see also Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, 957 F.2d 631,
634 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear
Alaska native village's complaint seeking to evict nonmembers from its territory); Morongo
Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1077 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding federal
jurisdiction proper to entertain a suit brought by an Indian tribe to enforce its ordinance
against a non-Indian, noting that tribe had no tribal court); Richardson v. Malone, 762 F.
Supp. 1463, 1467 (N.D. Okla. 1991) (concluding that because of the absence of tribal
courts and the lack of state court jurisdiction, federal courts would have jurisdiction over
case). See generally Julie A. Pace, Comment, Enforcement of Tribal Law in Federal Court:
Affirmation of Indian Sovereignty or a Step Backward Towards Assimilation?, 24 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 435 (1992) (reviewing the extent of tribal, state, and federal civil jurisdiction over
Indian reservations and discussing unique situations civil litigants face when seeking an
appropriate forum).
204. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
205. See, e.g., State ex rel. Old Elk v. District Court, 552 P.2d 1394, 1398 (Mont. 1976);
Wildcatt v. Smith, 316 S.E.2d 870,879 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); County of Vilas v. Chapman,
361 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Wis. 1985).
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Williams v. Lee preclude state jurisdiction regardless of the unavail-
ability of a tribal forum.2°
Transposed to the federal courts, the "no forum" problem
presents new considerations. Those state courts that accepted
jurisdiction in the absence of a tribal remedy or a tribal forum were
able to rely on their general subject matter jurisdiction. Federal
courts have no such analogue." Under the National Farmers
definition of federal question jurisdiction,2 8 however, the federal
courts have broad subject matter jurisdiction over lawsuits involving
Native Americans and the tribes. If the absence of a tribal forum
makes the exhaustion of tribal remedies impossible, the federal court
may resolve the underlying dispute. In yet another context, therefore,
the tribal exhaustion doctrine creates the possibility of broad federal
jurisdiction over lawsuits that had previously been dismissed for lack
of a federal question.2"
6. Choice of Forum Clauses
In several recent contract disputes involving tribal enterprises,
non-Indian parties have relied on "choice of forum" clauses to escape
the exercise of tribal jurisdiction.21 ° National Farmers' clearly left
an important question unanswered: Can the parties agree to resolve
206. E.g., Enriquez v. Superior Court, 565 P.2d 522, 523 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (noting
that "the fact that the record here does not disclose whether the Tribal court does in fact
provide a forum for the recovery for personal injuries is of no moment"); Schantz v. White
Lightning, 231 N.W.2d 812, 816 (N.D. 1975); accord, COHEN, supra note 33, at 250 n.62.
207. Obviously troubled by that fact, Judge Loken concurred in the Eight Circuit's
decision to require exhaustion of tribal remedies, but noted that post-exhaustion review
would be unprecedented in view of the fact that " '[flederal courts... possess only that
power authorized by Constitution and statute,' and I know of no statute giving the district
and circuit courts jurisdiction to review tribal court decisions." Duncan Energy Co. v.
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294, 1302 (8th Cir.
1994) (Loken, J., concurring) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct.
1673, 1675 (1994)).
208. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
209. See cases cited supra notes 203-05. But see Northwest S.D. Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Smith, 784 F.2d 323, 325-26 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that mortgagee's suit seeking
foreclosure of Indian trust lands did not state federal cause of action, and tribal court had
jurisdiction).
210. See Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 814 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 621 (1993); Nenana Fuel v. Native Village of Venetie, 834 P.2d 1229,
1233 (Alaska 1992) (refusing to order exhaustion because tribal entity had agreed to suit
in state court); Fuller v. Blaze Constr. Co., 20 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) 6011, 6012 (Rosebud Souix Ct. App., Jan. 14, 1993) (remanding to trial court to
determine validity of choice of venue provision in contract and to find whether the federal




their disputes in a state or federal forum, even though the tribal court
would also have jurisdiction over an eventual lawsuit? In one regard,
the answer is straightforward; because choice of forum clauses cannot
create jurisdiction,' the doctrine of Williams v. Lee will determine
the legitimacy of state court assertions of jurisdiction 1  The scope
of federal court adjudicatory power, however, is not at all clear.
The validity of a choice of law provision expressly designed to
allow the non-Indian parties to avoid suit in tribal court was at issue
recently in Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Manufacturing Co.211 In that
case, the Seventh Circuit refused to require the plaintiff, an Illinois
law firm, to exhaust its tribal remedies in a suit to collect attorneys'
fees allegedly owed by the defendant tribal enterprise.214 The court
found the National Farmers exhaustion rule inapplicable for many
reasons: the tribal court would have to interpret unfamiliar state law
because the contract specified that Illinois law would resolve all
disputes; no tribal court proceedings were pending; no tribal or-
dinance was involved in the lawsuit; and no attack on the tribal
court's jurisdiction had been made.21 More importantly, the court
noted that the tribal enterprise had sought "to avoid characterization
of the contract as a reservation affair by actively seeking the federal
forum. 2 16  To refuse to enforce the choice of law provision, the
court concluded, might have the disastrous effect of making tribal
enterprises noncompetitive in regional or national markets, "and the
Tribe's efforts to improve the reservation's economy may come to
naught.)217
Choice of law provisions, then, may provide an effective means
of counteracting the exhaustion doctrine. Given National Farmers's
broad definition of federal jurisdiction, especially when combined with
Iowa Mutual's recognition of underlying federal diversity jurisdiction
over on-reservation lawsuits, choice of law provisions may remove
211. See Brown v. Washoe Hous. Auth., 835 F.2d 1327, 1328 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding
that although the "sue and be sued" clause in the contract supported federal diversity
jurisdiction, exhaustion of tribal remedies was required as a matter of comity).
212. In most sophisticated business deals between tribal and nontribal enterprises,
however, off-reservation contacts are likely to be significant, thus weakening the claim of
exclusive tribal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma, 754 P.2d 845, 850-51
(N.M. 1988) (confirming state court jurisdiction over Native American doing business off
the reservation).
213. 983 F.2d 803 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 621 (1993).
214. Id. at 814-15.
215. Id. at 814.
216. Id. at 815.
217. Id.
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many cases from tribal court. If concern for tribal sovereignty is
really the motivating factor behind the exhaustion doctrine, however,
perhaps the Seventh Circuit should have allowed the tribal court to
determine the validity and scope of the contract's choice of law
provision."'
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR JuDIcIAL ABANDONMENT OF THE TRIBAL
EXHAUSTION RULE
Although the most frequently stated justification for tribal
exhaustion is to effectuate Congress's strong commitment to tribal
sovereignty,219 careful analysis of the Supreme Court's opinions and
of the lower court implementation of those decisions reveals that the
reality falls far short of that ideal. Worse yet, the doctrine has
unnecessarily complicated at least two aspects of the jurisdictional
line-drawing process among the state, tribal, and federal courts. First,
by declaring that all disputes over the scope of tribal court jurisdiction
are substantial federal questions,' ° the Court has added a new layer
to what is often nothing more than a dispute between state and tribal
court jurisdiction. And second, the doctrine has been interpreted by
some courts as requiring exhaustion so that tribal courts may
determine the scope of tribal regulatory power over individuals and
territory,"1 even though that dispute is purely a question of federal
law. In this section, the Article will analyze these deficiencies in the
exhaustion doctrine and ultimately will call for the rule's demise.
A. Tribal Exhaustion and Tribal Sovereignty
On its face, the tribal exhaustion rule promotes tribal sovereignty
by establishing that "tribal courts are the primary forums for
adjudicating civil disputes on the reservation."'' It is true that,
since National Farmers and Iowa Mutual, the lower federal courts
have refused to exercise federal court jurisdiction to resolve many on-
reservation disputes, at least until the tribal court has taken its "first
218. Similar questions have arisen in tribal court. In Fuller v. Blaze Constr. Co., 20
Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6011 (Rosebud Souix Ct. App., Jan.
14, 1993), for example, the tribal appellate court remanded a case to the trial court for an
opinion on the enforceability of a contract provision that purported to give the defendant
the sole power to choose federal court or tribal court for resolution of all legal disputes
arising under the contract. Id. at 6011-12.
219. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
222. Pommersheim, Crucible of Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 329.
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crack" at the matter. The negative implications of these opinions
may be less obvious, but they are no less real.
First and foremost, the tribal exhaustion rule has become a
jurisdictional bootstrap, creating federal question jurisdiction for many
disputes previously found to be outside the purview of the federal
courts. Prior to the exhaustion rule, for example, the federal courts
routinely dismissed lawsuits brought to resolve on-reservation contract
claims, 4 lease disputes,' and personal injury cases? 6  Under
National Farmers's expansive definition of federal question jurisdic-
tion, however, these cases now present issues that will ultimately be
decided by the federal courts. Rather than establishing a barrier to
federal court involvement in tribal affairs, then, the exhaustion
doctrine in essence opens the federal courthouse door for many
disappointed tribal court litigants.
In addition, the tribal exhaustion doctrine suggests that subse-
quent federal court review will not be limited to jurisdictional
questions. As discussed earlier, lower federal courts have generally
interpreted National Farmers and Iowa Mutual as allowing expansive
review of the merits of a dispute. 7 It is difficult to argue that tribal
sovereignty is enhanced by a rule that treats the decisions of the
223. Tom's Amusement Co. v. Cuthbertson, 816 F. Supp. 403, 406 (W.D.N.C. 1993)
(noting that "[w]here the civil action involves non-Indian parties, concerns incidents which
occurred off of the reservation, and will not impact the tribe's authority, there is little
reason to require that the tribal court have first crack at the case").
224. Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians v. Apex Constr. Co., 757 F.2d 221,223 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985); Gila River Indian Community v. Henningson, Durham &
Richardson, 626 F.2d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1980) (denying federal question jurisdiction and
noting that to assume jurisdiction would convert the federal court into a "small claims
court for all [Indian contract] disputes"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981); Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Martinez, 519 F.2d 479, 481 (10th Cir. 1975); Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d
486, 488 (9th Cir. 1965), cert denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966); Blackfeet Tribe v. Wippert, 442
F. Supp. 65, 66 (D. Mont. 1977); Ware v. Richardson, 347 F. Supp. 344, 347 (W.D. Okla.
1972); see also Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873
F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that "federal question jurisdiction does not exist
merely because an Indian tribe is a party or the case involves a contract with an Indian
tribe").
225. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d
1376, 1379,1386 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. Morongo Band of Mission
Indians, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989); United States ex reL Rollingson v. Blackfeet Tribal Court,
244 F. Supp. 474, 478 (D. Mont. 1965).
226. Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67, 69 (8th Cir. 1974); Meeks v. McAdams,
390 F.2d 650, 651 (10th Cir. 1968); Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 499 F. Supp. 1317, 1322
(D. Ariz. 1980), affid, 682 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982).
227. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
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tribe's highest judicial body as open to relitigation in the lower federal
courts.
B. Upsetting the Williams v. Lee Applecart
The negative effects of tribal exhaustion extend beyond the
immediate context of disputed assertions of federal and tribal
jurisdiction. In fact, the doctrine has important implications for
determining the proper spheres of state and tribal court jurisdiction
as well. In two important ways, the exhaustion doctrine has inserted
a layer of unnecessary federal court involvement. First, by converting
all challenges to tribal court jurisdiction into federal questions, it
provides a federal overlay to what is in reality a jurisdictional dispute
between the state and tribal courts, thus creating another forum in
which determined litigants may challenge tribal court
decisionmaking. Pre-National Farmers cases dismissed by the
federal courts for lack of federal question jurisdiction would now
involve the federal question of the scope of tribal court jurisdic-
tion. 9  Second, the exhaustion doctrine automatically prefers a
tribal forum even when state court jurisdiction is proper.
Ever since the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Lee, 2 0
the state and tribal courts have strived to delineate the contours of
exclusive tribal court jurisdiction."' At the same time, as tribes
228. See, e.g., Sanders v. Robinson, 864 F.2d 630, 631 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (referring to
the case's "long and tortuous history"), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989); Tohono
O'Odham Nation v. Schwartz, 837 F. Supp. 1024,1034 (D. Ariz. 1993); Brown v. Rice, 760
F. Supp. 1459, 1462 (D. Kan. 1991).
229. See, e.g., Gila River Indian Community v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, 626
F.2d 708, 709, 715 (9th Cir. 1980) (dismissing negligence suit brought by tribe against
architectural firm and building contractor.
230. 358 U.S. 217 (1959); see supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
231. For a detailed description of the evolution of this issue in Montana, see Margery
H. Brown & Brenda C. Desmond, Montana Tribal Courts: Influencing the Development
of Contemporary Indian Law, 52 MONT. L. REV. 211, 250-304 (1991); see also Frank
Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?, 36 S.D. L. REV. 239, 248-76
(1991) (examining attempts by tribal and state courts to address the nature of the legal
relationship between tribes and states). For recent state court discussions of the scope of
tribal court authority, see, for example, Tracy v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 810
P.2d 1030, 1041-46 (Ariz. 1991); Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, Mercury, Lincoln,
Inc., 462 N.W.2d 164, 167-71 (N.D. 1990); Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737,741-42
(S.D. 1985). For state court cases in which the state concluded that Williams v. Lee did
not oust the state court of jurisdiction, see Paiz v. Hughes, 417 P.2d 51, 52 (N.M. 1966);
Alexander v. Cook, 566 P.2d 846, 849 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977) (assuming jurisdiction over a
dispute involving tribal land and arising on the reservation because all parties were non-
Indians); Rolette County v. Eltobgi, 221 N.W.2d 645, 648 (N.D. 1974) (concluding that
state court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit filed by an Indian against a non-Indian).
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have entered into increasingly complex business and economic
development activities with non-Indian partners, the reach of Williams
v. Lee has become less clear. In fact, state and federal courts have
recognized that in cases involving numerous off-reservation and on-
reservation contacts, concurrent state and tribal jurisdiction exists.2
The court that ultimately exercises jurisdiction, of course, depends on
the plaintiff's choice of forum when filing the suit. 3 The tribal
exhaustion doctrine, though, ignores the states' interest in adjudicating
disputes with numerous off-reservation contacts. By directing the
parties to exhaust their tribal remedies, the federal court unnecessarily
and automatically prefers the tribal court for resolution of all disputes
involving a reservation or tribal contact. Again, this problem derives
from the Supreme Court's broad definition of jurisdiction in its tribal
exhaustion opinions: with the definition's virtually unlimited reach,
the federal courts are now able to channel into tribal courts many
cases that under a Williams v. Lee analysis would not fall within the
tribal courts' exclusive jurisdiction.
C. Restricting Federal Court Jurisdiction
In another important way, the tribal exhaustion doctrine may
improperly restrict the lower federal courts' general subject matter
232. In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989), Justice Blackmun noted "the Court has recognized coextensive state and
tribal civil jurisdiction where the exercise of concurrent authority does not do violence to
the rights of either sovereign." Id. at 466 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); see, e.g., In re
Custody of K.K.S., 508 N.W.2d 813,817 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); C.W. v. D.W., 479 N.W.2d
105, 112 (Neb. 1992); Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 734 P2d 754, 756 (N.M.
1987); Wacondo v. Concha, 873 P.2d 276,280 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); Jackson County Child
Support Enforcement Agency ex reL Jackson v. Swayney, 352 S.E.2d 413, 419-20 (N.C.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987); Harris v. Young, 473 N.W.2d 141, 145-46 (S.D. 1991);
Wells v. Wells, 451 N.W.2d 402, 405-06 (S.D. 1990); Sanapaw v. Smith, 335 N.W.2d 425,
430 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Smith Plumbing Co.,
856 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the state court had jurisdiction when
a suit is between non-Indians and "no Indian assets or other property situated in Indian
country could be directly affected by [the judgment]"); A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 19 Indian
L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3163,3164 (D.N.D., Sept. 16,1992) (holding
that the tribal court had jurisdiction over a tort action arising from an automobile collision
on the reservation between two non-Indians); Cowan v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 404 F. Supp.
1338, 1341 (D.S.D. 1975) (holding that the tribal court had jurisdiction over the matters
of use and regulation of tribal lands); Lewis v. Sac & Fox Tribe of Oklahoma Hous. Auth.
No. 78825, 1994 WL 43667, at *3 (Okla. Feb. 9, 1994) (holding that the state court had
jurisdiction over a contract action involving land transactions between Indian buyers and
state-created Indian housing authorities).
233. See A-1 Contractors, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at
3164 (referring to the plaintiff's "discretionary choice of forum").
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jurisdiction. Although National Farmers and Iowa Mutual involved
disputes over the tribal courts' adjudicatory jurisdiction over personal
injury cases, the Court refused to limit its exhaustion rule specifically
to that context. That is, with its general assertion that questions of
tribal jurisdiction should be resolved initially in tribal courts, the
Court suggested that the federal court should defer to the tribal forum
on all challenges to tribal power.' As a result, lower federal courts
have ordered exhaustion of tribal remedies in lawsuits filed in federal
court to challenge the ability of a tribe to regulate a non-Indian's
shorefront propertye 5 or to impose a tax on non-Indian businesses
within the exterior borders of the reservation.26
Ordering exhaustion in this context runs counter to established
Supreme Court precedent, both before and after National Farmers.
In Montana v. United States,' for instance, the Court did not
require the tribal court to provide a preliminary interpretation of the
scope of the tribe's power to regulate the hunting and fishing activities
of non-Indians on the reservation. Similarly, in Kerr-McGee Corp. v.
Navajo Tribe of Indians,' a case decided in the same term as
National Farmers, the Court made no mention of tribal exhaustion in
a challenge to a tribal tax filed by a non-Indian corporate lessee."
Nor did the Court in its post-National Farmers decision in Brendale
v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation2 40
remand to the tribal court for a determination of whether the tribe's
zoning ordinance could apply to non-Indian defendants.241 Similar-
ly, exhaustion was not an issue in South Dakota v. Bourland,242 in
234. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
235. E.g., Middlemist v. Dep't of Interior, 824 F. Supp. 940, 947 (D. Mont. 1993), affd,
19 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 94-42, 1994 WL 372819 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1994).
236. Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation,
27 F.3d 1294, 1299 (8th Cir. 1994). But see Texaco, Inc. v. Zah, 5 F.3d 1374, 1378 (10th
Cir. 1993) (supporting exhaustion rule but remanding to district court for application of
National Fanners to determine whether exhaustion of tribal remedies is appropriate in a
case involving the applicability of tribal taxes to non-Indians on business activity occurring
outside the reservation but within Indian Country).
237. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
238. 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
239. Id. at 196-201. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), oil and
gas lessees of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe also challenged the ability of the tribe to impose
a severance tax on their mineral production. Id. at 133, 159. In their federal court
challenge as well, no mention was made of the availability of a tribal court forum.
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 539 (10th Cir. 1980), affd, 455 U.S. 130
(1982).
240. 492 U.S. 408, 432-33 (1989).
241. Id.
242. 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
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which the Court upheld a challenge filed by the State of South
Dakota to the Cheyenne Tribe's attempt to prevent non-Indian
hunting on lands not owned by the tribe but located within the
borders of the reservation.243 Rather, in each of these cases, the
Court addressed the challenge to the tribe's power over non-Indians
on its merits, without mentioning the possibility of preliminary tribal
court review.244
Moreover, allowing the tribal court to take "first crack" at issues
that involve no question of tribal law serves no policy of the exhaus-
tion doctrine.24 As described by the Supreme Court, the exhaus-
tion principle was designed to further the "orderly administration of
justice" by allocating to a forum the resolution of disputes particularly
within the scope of that forum's expertise. 46 Though interpretation
of state and federal law is certainly within the purview of tribal court
jurisdiction, 47 the tribal court can claim no particular or unique
expertise in these areas. Applying the exhaustion rule to allow a
tribal forum to decide whether the tribe retains its sovereignty to
regulate delegates to the tribal forum a purely nontribal and exclu-
sively federal question.
V. REDEFINING FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION OVER
TRIBAL MATTERS
A. The Supreme Court's Expansive Definition
Ironically, the tribal exhaustion rule itself became necessary in
part because of the Supreme Court's broad definition of federal
question jurisdiction. That is, by concluding that the scope of a tribe's
adjudicatory and legislative power constituted a federal question,
every civil dispute involving a tribal court or other tribal entity was
243. Id. at 2319-21.
244. An Eighth Circuit judge recently made the same observation in a concurrence that
described the difficult problems created by the tribal exhaustion doctrine. See Duncan
Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294,
1301-03 (8th Cir. 1994) (Loken, J., concurring).
245. For instance, in a case referred by the federal district court to tribal court for
resolution of a dispute over the sovereign power of a tribe to impose a tax on non-Indian
lessees, the tribal trial court cited federal cases exclusively in its analysis. See Mustang
Fuel Corp. v. Cheyenne Arapahoe Tax Comm'n, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law.
Training Program) 6095, 6096 (Cheyenne-Arapahoe Dist. Ct., Jan. 31, 1991).
246. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856
(1985).
247. Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 814 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 621 (1993).
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thereby transmogrified into a federal case.2' As if to lessen the
negative impact of that holding, the Court then added the re-
quirement that all of these newly created federal cases first go
through the tribal court system.249 Thus, the Court first exacerbated
the conundrum of federal plenary power by adopting a broad
definition of federal question jurisdiction in the context of tribal court
affairs, and then, perhaps feeling guilty about the blow it had just
dealt to tribal sovereignty, proceeded to defer all of those questions
to the tribal forum, while carefully preserving federal jurisdiction for
subsequent review. In essence the tribal exhaustion doctrine is
needed, not because the Supreme Court gives more weight to the
sovereignty of the tribe than to the sovereignty of a state,250 but
rather because the Court has defined federal question jurisdiction so
broadly that without exhaustion the federal courts could almost
completely usurp the jurisdiction of the tribal courts.
Once the National Farmers Court concluded that questions about
the scope of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction in a personal injury suit
constituted a federal question, 1 it was then confronted by a num-
ber of its own opinions, also involving challenges to the tribe's
jurisdiction, that did not require or even mention exhaustion. Of
those broad-ranging cases, the Court chose to distinguish only one,
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. 2 In Oliphant, the Court held
that tribes do not retain the sovereign power to punish non-Indians
who commit criminal acts within the borders of their reservations. 2 3
Exhaustion was not required in Oliphant, the National Farmers Court
explained, because federal legislation suggested that Congress
envisioned exclusive federal prosecution of offenses committed by
non-Indians in Indian country; 4 in addition, the Court noted, the
federal government had longstanding and firmly-held convictions
about the tribes' inability to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. 5  Disputes over the proper scope of tribal court ad-
248. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 852.
249. Id. at 856-57.
250. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 22 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(accusing the majority of suggesting that "the sovereignty of an Indian tribe is in some
respects greater than that of the State of Montana, for example").
251. See supra notes 64-65.
252. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
253. Id. at 212.





judicatory jurisdiction in civil matters, in contrast, were not
"automatically foreclosed" by similar federal policies. 2'
By describing Oliphant as an exception to the exhaustion rule
because of its particular facts, rather than by concluding that
challenges to coercive sovereign regulatory power are fundamentally
different from challenges to the propriety of a tribal court forum, the
Court unnecessarily equated disputes involving tribal legislative
jurisdiction with disputes involving tribal court adjudicatory
power.'5' Although the National Farmers Court took great pains to
show why exhaustion was not required in Oliphant, it failed to address
similar holdings in other cases. More importantly, though, the Court
failed to explain why the two cases should be treated the same for
purposes of delineating federal question jurisdiction. In essence, after
National Farmers any dispute involving a tribe or brought before a
tribal court is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts.258
B. The Proper Scope of Federal Question Jurisdiction in Indian Law
1. Distinguishing Adjudicatory Jurisdiction from Legislative
Jurisdiction
Although the Supreme Court rejected the distinction between
tribal legislative jurisdiction and tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction, the
line drawn by the Ninth Circuit in its National Farmers9 panel
opinion warrants careful reconsideration. Perhaps because it
recognized the broad implications of equating the jurisdictional
dispute in National Farmers with challenges to tribal regulatory power
that had always been the province of the federal courts, the Ninth
Circuit held that the facts of National Farmers presented no federal
256. Id. at 855.
257. Justice Marshall, in his description of the prior proceedings in Iowa Mutual,
however, did recognize the potential distinction between the scope of a tribe's adjudicative
jurisdiction and the scope of its legislative jurisdiction. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480
U.S. 9,12 (1987). Unfortunately, the remainder of the opinion fails to distinguish between
those two types of jurisdiction.
258. In Justice Blackmun's concurring and dissenting opinion in Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation he described Iowa Mutual as
"holding that the issue of jurisdiction over a civil suit brought against a non-Indian arising
from a tort occurring on reservation land must be resolved in the tribal courts in the first
instance" and thus suggested a possible narrowing interpretation of the scope of '
exhaustion. 492 U.S. 408, 455 n.5 (1989) (opinion of Blackmun, 1.) (emphasis added).
259. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir.
1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
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question for jurisdictional purposes.260 Thus, that court in effect left
the plaintiff with its tribal remedies and barred federal court
involvement in the dispute. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, federal
court involvement in tribal jurisdictional disputes had been carefully
limited to challenges to the coercive power of the tribe to regulate
conduct of particular individuals. 261 National Farmers, in contrast,
raised a fundamentally different question-the ability of a tribal
judicial forum to adjudicate a controversy before it. As the Ninth
Circuit noted, a judicial forum frequently applies a law other than its
own to a dispute it adjudicates;262 in that court's view, questions of
tribal adjudicatory power are essentially different from questions of
tribal regulatory or legislative power.263
At this preliminary point the Supreme Court parted ways with
the Ninth Circuit: in its National Farmers decision, the Supreme
Court clearly stated that because the scope of tribal sovereignty is a
federal question, all jurisdictional challenges to tribal court adjudicato-
ry power raise a federal question.264 Though the Supreme Court
may have stated that all jurisdictional challenges are indistinguishable,
its actual holdings reflect a different reality.
Since the days of Chief Justice John Marshall's famous opinion
in Johnson v. M'Intosh,265 the federal courts have exercised jurisdic-
tion over challenges to tribal regulatory power. Indeed, in Montana
v. United States2 66 the Court adopted a very limited view of the
scope of that regulatory power, announcing what amounts to a
260. Id. at 1323.
261. See id. The Ninth Circuit, reviewing the case law in its own circuit, cited two cases
in which it had found federal question jurisdiction to review the permissible scope of tribal
regulatory power over non-Indians. Id. (citing Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe,
710 F.2d 587, 591 (9th Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984); Cardin v. De La Cruz,
671 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982)).
262. See National Farmers, 736 F.2d at 1322 n.3. As Judge Fletcher noted, "[c]ases are
commonly adjudicated in forums that would lack the authority to regulate the subject
matter of the disputes." Id.
Moreover, as one concurring judge in a recent Eighth Circuit exhaustion case
observed, "the tribal court of course has jurisdiction to enforce a tribal tax or employment
law. The federal question here goes to the merits of the case-whether the Tribe has the
sovereign power to enact the tax and employment laws being enforced." Duncan Energy
Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294, 1302 (8th
Cir. 1994) (Loken, J., concurring).
263. See National Farmers, 736 F.2d at 1322.
264. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852
(1985).
265. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding that Indian tribes had no power sustainable
by courts in the United States to give title to land).
266. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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presumption that tribal attempts to regulate nonmembers are
invalid.267 Until National Farmers, however, the Supreme Court had
never considered a challenge to a tribal court's adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion. In that initial consideration, though, the crimped Montana view
of sovereignty did not surface. Instead, in the articulation of its
exhaustion doctrine, the Court adopted a radically different presump-
tion, concluding in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante that "[c]ivil
jurisdiction over [the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands]
presumptively lies in the tribal courts."2'6
With that language, the Court created confusion and inconsisten-
cy. First, it decided in National Farmers that, for purposes of federal
question jurisdiction, distinguishing adjudicatory jurisdiction from
legislative jurisdiction is improper;269 simultaneously, the Court
articulated a broad presumption in favor of tribal jurisdiction that is
fundamentally inconsistent with its earlier statements about the scope
of tribal sovereign powers over nonmembers.27 Although the
Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's distinction between
legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction, the Court's failure to consider
fully the implications of its broad jurisdictional rule, coupled with its
announcement of a presumption about the scope of tribal jurisdiction
that contravenes the holdings of cases decided before and after
National Farmers, suggests that reconsideration may be possible. In
fact, in at least two oblique references in post-National Farmers cases,
some justices have shown a willingness to distinguish the tribe's ad-
judicatory jurisdiction from its legislative jurisdiction.
First, in Iowa Mutual Insurance Cos. v. LaPlante,2" which
extended the tribal exhaustion rule to apply in diversity cases, the
Court observed in a somewhat cursory manner: "Since the Tribe's
adjudicative jurisdiction was coextensive with its legislative jurisdic-
267. Id. at 565.
268. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987)
269. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 851-53.
270. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18. The plaintiff tribe in Brendale relied on the Court's
pro-sovereignty statements in National Farmers and Iowa Mutual to defend the tribe's
exercise of regulatory power over non-Indians. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 427 (1989) (opinion of White, J.). Justice
White's partial dissent, however, described that reliance as "misplaced" and clarified that
the pro-sovereignty language in the exhaustion cases applied only to allow "the tribal
courts initially to determine whether they have jurisdiction." Id. at 427 n.10 (opinion of
White, J.). In his plurality opinion, however, Justice Blackmun asserted that Justice White
had "read too little" into the exhaustion cases' pro-sovereignty position. Id. at 455 n.5
(opinion of Blackmun, J.).
271. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
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tion, the [tribal] court concluded that it would have jurisdiction over
the suit." 2  Although the meaning of that observation is unclear
and potentially inconsistent with the Court's references to the breadth
of the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the tribal court,273 it at least
stands as evidence that the Court does recognize a difference between
the two types of tribal jurisdiction.
More recently, in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation,274 the Court held, through a curious amal-
gamation of pluralities, that the tribe retained the sovereign power to
zone non-Indian fee lands located in a part of the reservation
normally closed to the general public, but that it could not zone the
non-Indian fee lands in the reservation's "open" area.275 In his
opinion for three members of the Court, however, Justice Blackmun
described the exhaustion cases as requiring "that the issue of
jurisdiction over a civil suit brought against a non-Indian arising from
a tort occurring on reservation land must be resolved in the tribal
courts in the first instance. ' ' 7' This gloss on the exhaustion rule
272. Id. at 12.
273. In the context of the exhaustion rule, that observation is somewhat puzzling. The
National Farmers Court ordered exhaustion of tribal remedies to allow the tribal court to
resolve a personal injury claim that arose from an accident that occurred on a school
located within the borders of the reservation, but not on tribal land. National Farmers, 471
U.S. at 847. Established Supreme Court precedent in Montana and Brendale strongly
suggests that the tribe in National Farmers lacked regulatory jurisdiction over activities on
school property; that is, it appears unlikely that a tribal building code, for example, would
apply to the school. See supra text accompanying notes 196-200. Nevertheless, the Court
implicitly recognized that, given the on-reservation location of the school coupled with the
Indian status of the plaintiff, the tribal court forum was the proper place for adjudication
of this lawsuit. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856. For the Iowa Mutual Court to
somehow link the scope of a tribe's "adjudicative jurisdiction" to the scope of its
"legislative jurisdiction" adds yet another uncertainty to the Court's exhaustion rule.
274. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
275. See id. at 428. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Kennedy, wrote an opinion that would deny the tribe's ability to zone non-Indian
property at all locations on the reservation. Id. at 428. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and
Marshall believed that the tribe's exercise of zoning power could properly apply to all
property within the reservation's exterior boundaries. Id. at 465 (opinion of Blackmun,
J.). Justices Stevens and O'Connor, the two key swing votes, voted to uphold the tribe's
zoning authority over non-Indian property only for land located in the "closed" portion
of the reservation. Id. at 447 (opinion of Stevens, J.). Thus, Stevens and O'Connor
concurred with White's opinion, which voted to deny all tribal zoning authority to non-
Indian land, with respect to the "open" portion of the reservation. Id. (opinion of Stevens,
J.).
276. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 472 U.S.
408, 455 n.5 (1989) (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (emphasis added). Interestingly enough,
Justice Blackmun's description of the facts of the exhaustion cases was not quite accurate.
The injury in National Farmers occurred, not on reservation land, but on land owned by
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may indicate that at least some members of the Court do not equate
challenges to tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction with challenges to tribal
legislative jurisdiction for purposes of delimiting federal court
involvement.
In sum, the Court's subsequent statements about different types
of tribal jurisdiction and its actual holdings in the legislative jurisdic-
tion cases belie its refusal in National Farmers to make that dis-
tinction. In fact, the Court has articulated very different starting
presumptions about the legitimacy of tribal jurisdiction, which depend
exclusively on whether the jurisdiction to be exercised is adjudicatory
or legislative. Explicit recognition of the essential difference between
the two would be an important first step towards a proper redefinition
of federal question jurisdiction in Indian law.2'
2. Removing Questions of Tribal Adjudicatory Jurisdiction from
the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction
The conclusion that adjudicatory jurisdiction is different from
legislative or regulatory jurisdiction does not, of course, necessarily
dictate that one is a federal question while the other is not. Several
important considerations, however, argue in favor of the Ninth
Circuit's opinion that challenges to tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction
should not constitute a federal question. Among the most immediate
practical consequences, perhaps, is the observation that taken to its
logical extreme, the expansive National Farmers definition of federal
the State within the borders of the reservation. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 847. Justice
White also mentioned the exhaustion cases in his Brendale opinion. Brendale, 492 U.S.
at 426 n.10 (opinion of White, J.). In a footnote, he rejected the tribe's argument that the
exhaustion cases were relevant to judicial determination of the scope of retained tribal
authority over non-Indians; rather, he limited the import of those cases to the exhaustion
rule they establish. Id. (opinion of White, J.).
277. In a recent book review of the AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, a treatise
published by a group of Attorneys General from various western states, Professor Joseph
Singer highlighted yet another unwelcome result of the Court's failure to distinguish
adjudicatory jurisdiction from legislative jurisdiction. Professor Singer criticized the
DESKBOOK for citing the legislative jurisdiction line of cases such as Montana, Brendale,
and Duro v. Reina as support for a very narrow view of tribal court adjudicatory
jurisdiction. Joseph W. Singer, Remembering What Hurts Us Most: A Critique of the
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, 24 N.M. L. REv. 315, 326-27 (1994). In Professor
Singer's view, the DESKBOOK authors were advancing their own political agenda by relying
on the narrower view of sovereignty put forth in the legislative jurisdiction cases, while
ignoring the Court's endorsement of tribal sovereignty as reflected in National Farmers and
Iowa Mutual. See id. at 316-17, 325-27. In this way, he suggested, the authors' proposition
that "tribes have no power over nonmembers unless the nonmember has entered tribal
land or made a contract with the tribe or a tribal member" is somewhat misleading. Id.
at 328.
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question jurisdiction will allow for total federal court review of tribal
court proceedings. For example, it would encompass disputes over
whether the tribal court retains the sovereign power to award
damages for pain and suffering, whether it can apply state law to the
facts before it, or whether it can disallow interlocutory appeals. In
essence, National Farmers raises every aspect of tribal court ad-
judication to the level of a federal question, and thus preserves the
possibility of ultimate federal review in all of those cases. Given that
approximately 200 tribes currently have tribal court systems, 278 some
of which handle substantial caseloads,27 9 the implications of National
Farmers review for the lower federal courts is significant indeed.
In addition to the sheer practical implications of such enhanced
federal oversight of tribal court proceedings, several other concerns
argue against the federalization of disputes over tribal adjudicatory
jurisdiction. The creation of a judicial system is the exercise of a most
essential sovereign function, and the Supreme Court has frequently
reiterated its commitment to full tribal sovereignty. Although the
federal government has exercised substantial oversight in the
development of tribal court systems, no Supreme Court opinion or
Congressional enactment suggests that a tribal court is merely an
agency of the federal government. In fact, the Supreme Court
opinions are quite to the contrary: Since Ex parte Crow Dog,' the
Court has not wavered from its holding that because tribal courts are
emanations of inherent tribal sovereignty and not of the federal
government, they are not subject to constitutional limits." 1 It is
incongruous to hold that although tribal courts are free from the
strictures of federal constitutional limits (a principle based on the
tribes' precolonial sovereigntym), every aspect of their adjudicatory
proceedings raises a federal question that can ultimately be reviewed
and modified by the federal courts.m
278. INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTs AcT: REPORT, supra note 108, at 29.
279. For instance, in 1983 the Navajo Tribal Courts handled 40,406 cases, the Blackfeet
Tribal Court 8,158 cases, and the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 6,237 cases. Of course, not
all tribal court systems are as extensive in their operations. In the same year, some tribal
courts, such as the courts of the Taos Pueblo or the Las Vegas Paiute Tribe, disposed of
only a handful of cases. Id. at 32.
280. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
281. Id. at 568, 572.
282. The Supreme Court has emphasized the independent origin and extra-
Constitutional basis of tribal sovereign powers: "[T]he powers of local self government
enjoyed by the [tribe] existed prior to the Constitution." Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376,
384 (1896).
283. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572.
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Furthermore, even though Congress may possess the plenary
power to impose substantial limits on tribal court adjudicatory power,
it has studiously avoided legislation in this area. In marked contrast
to its frequent and pervasive pronouncements in criminal law, where
Congress has extinguished tribal power to exercise jurisdiction over
many crimes,' Congress has not acted to delineate the proper
scope of tribal court jurisdiction in civil cases. 285 Congressional
commitment to tribal sovereignty and its failure to restrict tribal court
jurisdiction over civil matters argue strongly in favor of removing the
intrusive federal court supervision over the scope of tribal ad-
judicatory power envisioned by National Farmers. 6
Moreover, unlike challenges to a tribe's assertion of its legislative
jurisdiction, which are resolved solely by reference to federal law,"
the scope of tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction will depend crucially
on the tribal court's interpretation of the wording of its own jurisdic-
tional ordinances. Just as the federal courts are powerless to disagree
with a state court's interpretation of its own laws, so too should the
tribal court be the final arbiter of the scope and meaning of its
legislative enactments.' To rule otherwise would contravene the
284. See COHEN, supra note 33, at 285-307.
285. Most recently, in the Indian Tribal Justice Support Act, the 103rd Congress
authorized appropriations upward of $50,000,000 per year for a seven-year period
beginning in 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-76 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (Supp. 1994)).
Professor Pommersheim has noted the "interestingo ... general absence of federal statutes
that deal with the allocation of [tribal court] civil jurisdiction .... " Pommersheim,
Crucible of Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 337.
286. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
287. See supra notes 263-75 and accompanying text.
288. See generally Pommersheim, Crucible of Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 361 (arguing
that tribal sovereignty and self-determination indicate the authority to declare and
interpret the law that will govern in a tribal forum); Frank Pommersheim, A Path Near the
Clearing: An Essay on Constitutional Adjudication in Tribal Courts, 27 GONZ. L. REV.
393,419 (199111992) [hereinafter Pommersheim, A Path Near the Clearing] (noting that "it
is less clear what a federal court should do when the alleged tribal court mistake is not one
of federal law, but rather of tribal law"). For additional discussion, see R.J. Williams Co.
v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that "if the dispute
itself calls into question the validity or propriety of an act fairly attributable to the tribe
as a governmental body," nontribal court adjudication would adversely affect tribal self-
government). The Supreme Court's statements about the preclusive nature of tribal court
interpretations of tribal law have been ambiguous at best. Admittedly, the Court has
stressed that "tribal courts are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law," Iowa Mut.
Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987), but its references to post-exhaustion review
have not excluded tribal court interpretations of its own laws. National Farmers, 471 U.S.
at 856 (allowing "a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits
or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed" (emphasis added)). Understan-
dably, some lower courts have interpreted Supreme Court precedent as allowing post-
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essence of the Supreme Court's statements about the origin and
independence of tribal judicial power. 9 Converting disputes over
tribal adjudicatory power into questions of federal law intrudes on
tribal sovereignty without furthering a federal interest.
Finally, as the Ninth Circuit noted in its National Farmers
opinion, the Supreme Court has recognized that creating a federal
common law cause of action is an "unusual course, to be approached
cautiously."2' Although the federal courts have heard challenges
to tribal legislative jurisdiction since Chief Justice John Marshall
decided Johnson v. M'Intosh," National Farmers marked the
Court's first foray into the scope of tribal adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion.2' Federal court creation of a common law cause of action is
appropriate only in a " 'few and restricted' instances,"2" when
"necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,, 294  or when
Congress has delegated lawmaking power to the federal courts. 295
Nothing in the National Farmers analysis suggests that the scope of
tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction qualifies as one of those
extremely unusual situations. The facts simply do not establish the
need for federal court supervision over the development of tribal
court jurisdiction,296 and the Supreme Court should remove those
issues from the scope of federal question jurisdiction.
The "defederalization" of challenges to tribal court adjudicatory
jurisdiction would recognize the tribal courts' fundamental sovereign
exhaustion scrutiny of tribal court interpretations of tribal law. See, e.g., Stock West Corp.
v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 1992); Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Crow Tribal Council,
940 F.2d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 1990); Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797
F.2d 668, 673-74 (8th Cir. 1986).
289. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1983).
290. National Farmers, 736 F.2d at 1323 (citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,312-
14 (1981)).
291. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
292. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 845.
293. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 313 (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647,
651 (1963)).
294. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
295. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981); see also
National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water, 858 F.2d 1409, 1412-13 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding that there is no federal common law remedy under the Clean Air Act); District
of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1085-86 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (refusing to
create federal common law public trust doctrine).
296. The Supreme Court and Congress have refused to create federal court jurisdiction
over tribal court interpretations of the Indian Civil Rights Act, a federal law that applies
selected provisions of the Bill of Rights to tribal governments. See Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); Enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act: Hearing
Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 81-82.
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interest in determining the scope of their jurisdictional reach. In
addition, it would remove an unnecessary federal overlay to what is
frequently nothing other than a dispute between tribal courts and
state courts. If, under a Williams v. Lee analysis,2  a court would
conclude that either the state or tribal courts could properly ad-
judicate a case, it is hard to defend federal court intervention to
implement a rule that automatically prefers the tribal forum to its
state counterpart.298
3. Eliminating the Exhaustion Requirement for Challenges to
Tribal Legislative Jurisdiction
In contrast to the Court's recent declaration in National
Farmers that the scope of tribal adjudicatory power is a federal
question, longstanding case precedent confirms that challenges to
tribal regulatory power are exclusively a question of federal common
law. Under well-established principles, the Court's analysis will
determine whether the challenged power falls within the scope of
retained sovereignty or would be "inconsistent with the dependent
status of the tribes.' ,2 1 The jurisdiction of the federal court to
review challenges to tribal sovereignty is beyond dispute.3" In fact,
the National Farmers Court did not suggest that it intended to redirect
the challenges to tribal legislative jurisdiction that had been resolved
exclusively by the federal courts in cases such as Montana v. United
States,3" Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,3" and New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe. 3
297. See supra notes 28-35, 93 and accompanying text.
298. Justice Stevens expressed similar concerns in the Supreme Court's application of
the exhaustion rule to cases coming to federal court pursuant to the court's diversity
jurisdiction. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 21-22 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
299. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
300. That review began in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), and has
continued to the present. In fact, many of the modem cases fail to address the question
of federal court subject matter jurisdiction, apparently assuming that it is beyond cavil.
E.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
301. 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (denying tribe's authority to regulate the hunting and
fishing activities of non-Indians on fee lands located within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation).
302. 455 U.S. 130, 159 (1982) (upholding tribal severance tax imposed on oil and gas
removed from tribal lands).
303. 462 U.S. 324,343 (1983) (invalidating state attempt to impose its laws on hunting
and fishing activities on reservation lands).
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Moreover, in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation,3" the first post-National Farmers challenge
to tribal legislative jurisdiction, the Court did not even consider the
tribal exhaustion rule.3 5 In Brendale, the tribe filed suit in federal
district court, seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction
affirming the applicability of its zoning ordinance to two separate
tracts of land within the reservation. 3°s Owners of these tracts had
filed development plans for their properties with the county, but not
with the tribe.3" In light of National Farmers's exhaustion rule and
its broad definition of jurisdiction for purposes of federal question
cases, it is somewhat curious that none of the three opinions in
Brendale questioned whether the federal court should have required
the tribe to exhaust its tribal remedies before bringing the lawsuit.0
The National Farmers opinion itself, with its failure to suggest the
applicability of exhaustion to its earlier resolutions of disputed
assertions of tribal legislative authority, when coupled with the
Court's subsequent holding in Brendale, leaves the lower federal
courts in the quandary of having to decide whether to follow the
Supreme Court's stated holding that exhaustion is required in all
challenges to tribal jurisdiction or its actual practice, which does not
require exhaustion in challenges to the scope of tribal regulatory
jurisdiction. The uncertainty created by National Farmers, then, lies
not in determining whether federal courts have subject matter
jurisdiction in these cases, but rather in whether the federal courts
should allow preliminary tribal court resolution of the federal ques-
tions.3°9
304. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
305. Id. at 409.
306. Id. at 408.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 409, 411-12. Similarly, the Court made no mention of the tribal exhaustion
rule in South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993), a case filed by the State of South
Dakota against officials of the Cheyenne Sioux Tribe to enjoin tribal exclusion of non-
Indians from certain lands located within the reservation. Judge Loken of the Eighth
Circuit recently wondered about this apparent inconsistency in Duncan Energy Co. v.
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294, 1302 (8th Cir.
1994) (Loken, J., concurring) (attributing Supreme Court silence on the exhaustion rule
in these cases to the failure of the parties to raise the issue). But see United States v.
Tsosie, 849 F. Supp. 768, 772 (D.N.M. 1994) (ordering exhaustion of tribal remedies sua
sponte, even though all parties to the lawsuit, including the United States and two Native
Americans, opposed tribal court involvement).
309. See supra notes 94-108 and accompanying text for a review of the inconsistency




Although perhaps more consistent with the National Farmers
exhaustion rule, the benefits of exhaustion in cases involving
challenges to a tribe's legislative jurisdiction are unclear. The scope
of retained tribal regulatory power is decided solely by reference to
federal law; tribal court expertise or familiarity with tribal law will not
illuminate subsequent federal court review. In addition, although the
stated purpose of the tribal exhaustion rule was to enhance or at least
confirm tribal sovereignty, subsequent de novo review310 of the
tribal court's resolution of federal law issues by the federal district
court weakens that commitment significantly. The Court should make
its verbiage conform to its actual practice: quite simply, the Court
should explicitly recognize that federal court resolution of challenges
to tribal legislative jurisdiction is proper and need not be deferred
unless tribal court proceedings are pending.
Holding that the federal courts should exercise their jurisdiction
in disputes over the scope of tribal legislative jurisdiction argues only
against requiring exhaustion of tribal remedies in those cases; it does
not suggest that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. That
is, even if the Court abandons its exhaustion requirement for
challenges to the scope of the tribe's regulatory powers, tribal courts
would nevertheless retain concurrent jurisdiction over those cases.3 '
This unremarkable situation would parallel the concurrent jurisdiction
of state courts to decide issues of federal law."2
To some proponents of heightened tribal court autonomy,
proposing concurrent jurisdiction in federal and tribal courts over
310. FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 943 (1991). The FMC court noted that no other court had yet reached this issue. Id.
at 1313. The court adopted a "deferential, clearly erroneous standard of review for factual
questions," id., and a de novo standard of review for federal legal questions, id. at 1314;
see also Joranko, supra note 9, at 299-306 (criticizing the FMC court's adoption of the
clearly erroneous standard); Pommersheim, A Path Near the Clearing, supra note 288, at
410 (noting that post-exhaustion federal court review of federal question is de novo).
311. In a recent Seventh Circuit case, even though the court refused to order
exhaustion, the court recognized that "[a] tribal court, presumably, is as competent to
interpret federal law as it is state law." Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d
803, 814, (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 621 (1993).
312. A decision to allow the federal courts to exercise their federal subject matter
jurisdiction rather than to defer automatically to the tribal courts would in turn require
extension of generally applicable common law doctrines that have shaped the relationship
between state and federal courts. For instance, general principles of abstention would
restrain the federal courts from taking jurisdiction to hear cases that would interfere
inappropriately with ongoing tribal court proceedings. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICrION 623-55 (1989), for a discussion of the applicability of Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), to state civil proceedings.
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questions of tribal regulatory jurisdiction undoubtedly seems
destructive of tribal sovereignty. This proposal, however, is but one
part of a whole: with a redefinition of federal question jurisdiction in
Indian law cases to exclude challenges to tribal adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion, the scope of that concurrent jurisdiction is narrowed to questions
whose resolutions depend exclusively on federal law. Only for
challenges to tribal legislative jurisdiction, then, will the party filing
the lawsuit be free to choose the forum. The tribe may seek to
enforce its ordinances by proceeding in tribal court;313 in some
instances, however, the tribe may prefer a federal forum, and this
option should not be denied. 14 Similarly, under this proposal,
individual plaintiffs will be able to exercise a choice of forum for
resolution of issues of federal law. 15 Moreover, contractual choice
of forum clauses, whose enforceability is suspect under Iowa Mutual's
directive to order exhaustion in diversity cases,316 would be subject
to the same judicial limits as their non-Indian counterparts.
313. E.g., Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Dupree Am. Legion Club, 19 Indian L. Rep.
(Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6097 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. Apr. 2,1992);
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Walsh, 19 Indian L. Rep. 6030 (Rosebud Sioux Tribal Ct., Oct.
22, 1991).
314. For instance, the tribe in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), filed suit in federal court to enforce tribal ordinances.
Similarly, the United States government in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981),
filed suit on behalf of the Crow Tribe seeking judicial enforcement of the tribe's hunting
and fishing regulations on land owned by non-Indians within the borders of the
reservation.
315. See A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) 3163,3164 (D.N.D., Sept. 16,1992). Because this proposal allows for concurrent
tribal and federal jurisdiction over the redefined and limited scope of federal question
jurisdiction, it would argue for adoption of Justice Stevens's partial dissent in Iowa Mutual,
arguing against application of the exhaustion rule in diversity cases. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co.
v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 22 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
316. These clauses may be crucial to the ability of the tribe to attract non-Indian
enterprises to engage in on-reservation development. As the Seventh Circuit noted: "If
contracting parties cannot trust the validity of choice of law and venue provisions, [the
tribal enterprise] may well find itself unable to compete and the Tribe's efforts to improve
the reservation's economy may come to naught." Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp.,
983 F.2d 803, 815 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 621 (1993). The stated commitment
of the federal government to tribal economic development and self-sufficiency strongly
favors allowing tribes to have the same freedom of contract as any non-Indian enterprise:
"To refuse enforcement of this routine contract provision would be to undercut the Tribe's
self-government and self-determination." Id.
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VI. TE NEED FOR CERTIORARI REVIEW OF TRIBAL COURT
DECISIONS
This Article has proposed a redefinition of federal question
jurisdiction, with the goal of eliminating federal court involvement in
disputes over the tribal court's scope of adjudicatory power.
Although this proposal would admittedly create a body of case law
that is currently unreviewable by any court, a well-known Supreme
Court case has already established that a large number of tribal court
decisions are insulated from federal review. The Supreme Court held
in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez17 that the Indian Civil Rights Act
did not create a federal cause of action,318 thereby establishing that
tribal court decisions under that Act are absolutely final and unre-
viewable. Predictably, the case triggered several calls for legislative
reform; Congress has introduced bills to grant federal district courts
jurisdiction over suits alleging violation of the Indian Civil Rights
Act.3 19 A more narrowly tailored proposal has suggested not full
federal district court jurisdiction to relitigate cases that have gone
through the tribal court system, but the creation of certiorari jurisdic-
tion in the Supreme Court over final decisions under the Indian Civil
Rights Act by tribal courts.3' This Article proposes an expansion
317. 436 U.S. 9 (1978).
318. Professor Kevin Worthen has argued that Santa Clara did more than merely fail
to find an implied right of action, but instead held that the federal court lacked jurisdiction
to hear lawsuits alleging any noncompliance with federal law. Worthen, supra note 51, at
67. Professor Worthen further argued that such a limitation of federal court jurisdiction
is unconstitutional under Article III of the Constitution. Id. at 118.
319. See, e.g., S. 2747, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). In 1989, the bill was modified and
reintroduced. S. 517, 101st. Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). For detailed critiques of these
legislative efforts, see Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 841,880-86 (1990); Vicki J. Limas, Employment Suits Against Indian
Tribes: Balancing Sovereign Rights and Civil Rights, 70 DENV. U. L. REv. 359, 387-89
(1993).
320. This proposal was made by Professor Clinton at hearings held by the United States
Commission on Civil Rights. Although Professor Clinton does not believe that federal
oversight of tribal enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act is necessary, he views the
grant of certiorari review as significantly less intrusive on tribal sovereignty than
alternative proposals. Enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act: Hearing before the
United States Commission on Civil Rights, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 81-82 (1988) (remarks of
Professor Robert N. Clinton). Professor Clinton elaborated on his position in Clinton,
Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 902-08. Professor Clinton proposed statutory language to
provide for general Supreme Court review by way of writ of certiorari. Id. at 893 n.126.
In his view, the creation of an intertribal court of appeals would likewise satisfy the
demand for review of tribal court opinions rendered under the Indian Civil Rights Act.
Id. at 892. He sees neither option as ideal. Id. at 889-90.
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of that certiorari jurisdiction, to encompass not merely tribal court
decisions interpreting the Indian Civil Rights Act, but also tribal court
rulings that involve any federal question.
Any call for federal judicial supervision over tribal courts
undoubtedly provokes claims of unwarranted federal intrusion into
the sovereignty of the tribes. This Article's endorsement of general
Supreme Court review of tribal court decisions by writ of certiorari
will indeed end the current insulation of some tribal court holdings.
At the same time, though, this proposal would strike a more careful
balance between respect for tribal sovereignty and the overarching
principle of judicial review than the current exhaustion doctrine,
which treats tribal courts as mere factfinders for the federal courts
and subjects their decisions to relitigation in federal district court.
Given the realities of the tribes' position in the American political
system, total independence of tribal court proceedings is not a
currently acceptable alternative.321 Moreover, complete insulation
of tribal court decisions from all federal judicial review will preclude
meaningful expansion and enhancement of tribal court powers.
Congress and the federal courts, whether they be racist and
"myopic''31 or merely insistent that all judicial forums within the
United States conform to their standards of fairness,3n are unlikely
to allow tribal courts to exercise significant coercive power over
nonmembers without the check of ultimate federal review. The task,
then, is to structure the federal court review in such a way as to
maximize tribal independence while ensuring meaningful opportunity
for redress of tribal sovereign abuses, be they real or imagined. This
Article's proposal to couple certiorari review with significant
limitations on federal question jurisdiction and elimination of the
321. See Clinton, Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 889; Robert Laurence, A Memoran-
dum to the Class, in Which the Teacher is Finally Pinned Down and Forced to Divulge His
Thoughts on What Indian Law Should Be, 46 ARK. L. REV. 1, 5-15 (1993); Laurence, The
Enforcement of Judgments, supra note 32, at 599; Laurence, Learning to Live with Plenary
Power, supra note 24, at 422-23.
322. Williams, Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric Myopia, supra note 24, at 454.
323. Resnik, supra note 24, at 747-58, suggested that pressures for federal court review
can be interpreted either as anti-tribal and assimilationist or merely as strong support for
the pervasive federal enforcements of standards of equality. See also Margery H. Brown
& Brenda C. Desmond, Montana Tribal Courts: Influencing the Development of Contem-
porary Indian Law, 52 MONT. L. REV. 211, 264 (1991) (describing the Montana courts'
"well-intentioned spirit and conventional judicial outlook" as the origin of that court's




tribal exhaustion rule will work toward that admittedly delicate
balance.
On the other side of the tribal sovereignty debate, this Article's
proposal to limit significantly federal court involvement in tribal court
decisionmaking is likely to produce the criticism that review by writ
of certiorari is an ineffective check on tribal court abuses. It is true
that the Supreme Court accepts only a very small number of
cases;3 4 presumably, review of tribal court decisions will be similarly
limited. Direct federal review, however, would not be the sole factor
exerting pressure on the tribal court system; thus, a few additional
observations are in order. Numerous incentives, both within and
outside the judicial system, currently affect tribal court assertions of
jurisdiction. For instance, the Department of the Interior retains the
power, in some instances, to disapprove tribal ordinances." Even
without that direct approval power, the lure of federal spending
undoubtedly affects many tribal decisions.326 Moreover, many tribes
are actively seeking non-Indian partners in economic development
projects; the availability of a tribal forum perceived as fair and
efficient by outsiders will enhance the marketability of those
projects.327 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a state court's
willingness to enforce tribal court judgments depends crucially on its
analysis of the fundamental fairness of the tribal court proceeding.3'
324. In 1991, for example, the Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments in 103 out of
a total 6,770 cases on its docket. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 205 (113th ed. 1993).
325. See Pommersheim, A Path Near the Clearing, supra note 289, at 394-400 for a
discussion of the current scope of federal approval power. Professor Pommersheim notes,
for instance, that the Rosebud Sioux Tribe recently amended its constitution to remove
the Secretary of the Interior's review power over tribal council legislative enactments. Id.
at 397.
326. Congress recently passed the Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107
Stat. 2004 (1993), codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (Supp. V 1993), appropriating $58
million annually for the next seven years. Recognizing the inadequate levels of funding
under which tribal court systems currently operate, Congress stressed the importance of
"tribal government involvement in and commitment to improving tribal justice systems."
Id. § 3601(9).
327. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has stressed the need for certainty and predictability
for non-Indian parties entering into business ventures on the reservation. Altheimer &
Gray v. Souix Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 815 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 621 (1993).
328. The state court will also review the propriety of tribal court jurisdiction over the
lawsuit to determine whether the tribal court entering the judgment had jurisdiction over
both the subject matter and the parties to the lawsuit. In Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d
638 (S.D. 1993), for example, the Supreme Court of South Dakota refused to enforce a
tribal court personal injury judgment against a non-Indian defendant and announced a
very limited view of tribal court jurisdiction. The South Dakota court ruled that the tribal
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Thus, although the addition of review by writ of certiorari will not in
itself guarantee that tribal court proceedings comply with the limits
Congress has placed on their operations, it would serve an important
role as one of several external structural pressures on the workings of
the tribal court.
VII. CONCLUSION
The tribal exhaustion doctrine, though touted as evidence of the
federal government's enthusiastic endorsement of tribal sovereignty,
has actually had several damaging effects on tribal sovereignty. First
and foremost, the doctrine expands the definition of federal question
jurisdiction to apply to nearly any decision made by a tribe in the
exercise of any of its governmental functions. In addition, it allows
expansive relitigation and federal court review on the merits of all
cases initially deferred by the federal court for exhaustion of tribal
court remedies. Simultaneously, the doctrine has improperly reduced
the ability of the federal courts to provide a forum for resolution of
exclusively federal issues. This Article, sensitive to both the
legitimate demands for tribal court autonomy and the fundamental
principle of the Supreme Court's ultimate power of judicial review in
matters of federal law, has proposed a shift that would reduce the
scope of general federal question litigation, but that would also allow
for selective review of tribal court proceedings by way of writ of
certiorari. The debate over the proper scope of tribal court
independence from federal court interference and review is an
court has the power to adjudicate only those controversies over which it can establish its
legislative jurisdiction. Id. at 646. Because the court concluded that the tribe has no
power to regulate the conduct of non-Indians driving on state highways through the
reservation, it concluded that the tribal court is similarly divested of its jurisdiction to hear
the lawsuit. Id. at 646-47. This crimped view of tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction
probably stems, in large part, from state courts' unwillingness to extend Williams v. Lee's
divestment of general state court adjudicatory jurisdiction beyond the specific facts of the
case. Compare Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschman Ford, 462 N.W.2d 164, 171 (N.D. 1990)
(finding a presumption of enforceability of tribal court judgments as a matter of comity);
Mexican v. Circle Bear, 3709 N.W.2d 737,741 (S.D. 1985) (finding that tribal court orders
should be recognized in state courts). See generally, Laurence, Enforcement of Judgments,
supra note 32, at 651-62 (1990) (arguing that state courts should not give "full faith and
credit" to tribal court decisions but should nevertheless honor such judgments in most
circumstances).
North Dakota has adopted legislation to govern judicial recognition of some tribal
court judgments; state enforcement depends on the tribe's willingness to recognize similar
state court judgments and recognizes only tribal judgments rendered by a tribal judge who
"is a graduate of an accredited law school and holds a current valid license to practice law
in at least one state." N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-09 (1991).
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ongoing one. As tribal courts enlarge their jurisdictional reach, and
as the cases within their jurisdiction grow in number and complexity,
the calls for full integration of that court system into the United
States's judicial system are likely to continue to grow. This Article
has examined the Supreme Court's current answer to that integration
dilemma and has argued that it improperly intrudes on tribal
sovereign prerogatives. Because complete autonomy and indepen-
dence from the federal court system is not within the realm of
possible or perhaps desirable alternatives, 9 this Article has
proposed a solution that would grant more autonomy from federal
court interference, recognize legitimate exercises of concurrent federal
and tribal jurisdiction, and in some ways place the decisions of final
tribal courts on a par with those of their state counterparts. With the
threat of frequent federal court interference greatly reduced, tribal
courts will be freer to go about their business of conflict resolution
and the development of judicial standards.33
329. See, e.g., Clinton, Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 863 (asserting that the "central
problem for federal Indian law during this post-colonial period must be how to decolonize
federal Indian law, taking account of, albeit not necessarily validating or justifying, the
altered economic realities and political relations that prior colonial Indian law policies and
doctrines engendered"); see also Robert Laurence, A Quincentennial Essay on Martinez
v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 307, 342 (1991-1992) (supporting federal review
of some tribal court decisions in recognition of the "actual state of things").
330. The challenge facing tribal courts has been the subject of various law review
articles. See, e.g., Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay
on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 WIs. L. REv. 411; Pommersheim, A Path Near the
Clearing, supra note 289; Taylor, supra note 9, at 231.
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